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SHU'UBIYYAt OR SECURITY? PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES
BY LIMITING FISA EVIDENCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY
PROSECUTIONS
William Pollak*
Ever since 9/11, this Administration has put forward a false choice
between the liberties we cherish and the security we demand.
-Barack Obama
commenting on the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008'
INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress
rushed to eliminate many of the legal restrictions on intelligence
gathering that were blamed for allowing the 9/11 attacks to go un-
detected. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
enacted in 1978, was one key statute targeted for reform. Prior to
9/11, FISA enabled the government to conduct foreign surveil-
lance without demonstrating probable cause of criminal activity
but restricted the use, in a criminal prosecution, of information
gathered during a foreign intelligence investigation. The USA
t Shu'ubiyya loosely translates to anti-Arabism or discrimination against Arabs. It is a
word with a deep history. Initially, shu'ubiyya did not have a derogatory connotation and was
used interchangeably with taswiya (equality) to convey a sense of the Persians struggle for
equality with Arabs. In modern times, however, shu'ubiyya has emerged in the political lexi-
con with purely derogatory connotations.
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 2008; Princeton University A.B. 2003.
Thanks to Professor Scott Hershovitz for helping me develop my ideas and for providing
useful comments on a draft of this Note.
1. Jane Hamsher, Barack Obama Statement on HSA, Jan. 28, 2008, http://firedoglake.
com/2008/01/28/barack-obama-statement-on-fisa/; Patrick Casey, Putting Obama and the
Dems on the Defensive, AMERICAN THINKER, June 20, 2008, http://www.freerepublic.com/
focus/f-news/2034053/posts; FISAlist: Barack, Jan 2008 On FISA, http://my.barackobama.
com/page/community/post/92104/gGxlHh (Jul. 6, 2008, 2:24 EST).
2. The current version of FISA only requires the government to demonstrate prob-
able cause that "the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power" and that the collection of foreign intelligence information is a "significant
purpose" of the investigation. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(3)(A) (2000). In addition, FISA does not
include an exclusionary rule and it only provides for limited judicial review of government
applications. See infra text accompanying notes 20-26.
3. The pre-USA PATRIOT ACT version of FISA required the government to demon-
strate that the collection of foreign intelligence information was the primary purpose of the
FISA warrant. This restriction limited the use of FISA evidence in ordinary criminal prosecu-
tions. See discussion infra Part II.
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PATRIOT ACT, however, amended FISA and eliminated these re-. • 4
strictions. Under the Patriot Act, enacted on October 26, 2001, the
government now may obtain a FISA warrant to wiretap5 a suspect
solely on the basis of an unchallenged certification by the govern-
ment that the suspect may be the agent of a foreign power or
terrorist organization. In addition, the amended act allows any in-
formation gathered pursuant to a FISA warrant to be used in an
"ordinary criminal prosecution." 6
As a result of these changes, the government can access the pri-
vate information of a broad swath of people who have only
minimal ties to foreign organizations. Any evidence, gathered pur-
suant to these wiretaps, is admissible in a criminal trial even if the
surveillance reveals that, in fact, the suspect has no ties to any for-. • 7
eign power or terrorist organization. As a result, FISA may lower
the statutory restrictions on the gathering of evidence, particularly
in criminal prosecutions of Muslim Americans and recent immi-
grants, who could easily be characterized as agents of foreign
powers simply because they continue to associate with their native
countries."
Equally disturbing, the admission of FISA evidence in non-
foreign intelligence prosecutions may result in the arbitrary en-
forcement of the criminal laws. Surveillance of a FISA subject often
necessitates monitoring all calls and emails from the suspect's
home and office including those of innocent family members or
co-workers. Indeed, internet surveillance of a FISA suspect often
requires capturing and reading the internet traffic of all the people
4. USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter the Pa-
triot Act].
5. FISA not only allows the government to listen to a suspect's phone calls, but also al-
lows the government to read a suspect's emails, to conduct "sneak-and-peak" searches of a
suspect's residence, and to use GPS technology to track a suspect's movements. See infra
notes 81, 126, 128.
6. I use the term "ordinary criminal prosecutions," and later, "ordinary crimes," to re-
fer to those criminal prosecutions and crimes without any connection to national security.
7. The Immigration and Nationality Act, §219(a)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)-(8)
(2006), sets out a scheme for the Secretary of State to designate certain organizations as
"foreign terrorist organization [s]." To make the designation, the Secretary has to make spe-
cific findings that "the organization is a foreign organization"; that "the organization
engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 1182(a) (3) (B))"; and that "the terrorist
activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national
security of the United States." § 1189(a) (1); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (2006) making it a
crime to provide "material support" to a foreign terrorist organization.
8. See generally Eric Lichtblau, Thousands From Muslim Nations Were Investigated Before '04
Election, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/31/us/31inquire.html (presenting evidence that "more than 2,500 foreigners [sev-
enty-nine percent of whom were from Muslim countries] in the United States were sought as
'priority leads' in the fall of 2004 because of suspicions that they could present threats to na-
tional security," the vast majority of whom were interrogated and detained but never charged).
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who live in the suspect's building or work in the suspect's office.
Any evidence of criminal activity conducted by other persons un-
fortunate enough to live or work in the vicinity of a FISA suspect
may also be captured and admitted in a criminal trial for an ordi-
nary crime.
At the same time, persuasive arguments can be made for a lower
standard to allow for the electronic surveillance of terrorists and
the acquisition of foreign intelligence information. Foreign intelli-
gence collection tends to be programmatic, focusing on nascent
schemes and following up on ambiguous leads. 9 In addition, terror-
ists operating in a loosely connected cell structure are hard to
identify and are typically well-trained in avoiding detection. Finally,
the desire for secrecy and the devastating cost of failing to detect a
terrorist plot necessitate an expedient approval process and may
call for a decreased standard of judicial review in cases involving
national security.
This Note attempts to balance these concerns by proposing a
rule limiting the admission of evidence gathered under FISA to
cases involving foreign intelligence/national security crimes such
as terrorism, sabotage, and espionage, and cases involving crimes
"inextricably intertwined" with national security offenses. Under
this test, for FISA evidence to be admissible, (1) the defendant
must be indicted and charged with a national security crime or a
crime involving the "material support" of a terrorist organization
or a foreign government; and (2) the judge must find, after an in
camera review, that the government has demonstrated a link be-
tween a foreign intelligence crime and the prosecution at issue.
Evidence obtained under a FISA warrant would be excluded from
prosecutions of ordinary crimes without a sufficient nexus to na-
tional security.
Part I of this Note addresses the restrictions on intelligence
gathering under FISA prior to 9/11 and the motivations underly-
ing the Patriot Act's revisions to FISA. Part II discusses the
problems with the "primary purpose" test, which was in effect prior
to the Patriot Act's revisions to FISA. Part III reviews the various
policy and constitutional arguments made against the Patriot Act's
"significant purpose" test. Part IV proposes that Congress enact a
new "inextricably intertwined" test to govern the admission of FISA
material in criminal prosecutions. Specifically, this Part looks at
sixty criminal cases in which FISA material was admitted and evalu-
ates how the "inextricably intertwined" test would play out in those
9. William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance After the Ter-
ror, 57 U. MIAMI L. RE%. 1147, 1152-53 (2003) [hereinafter Banks, Secret Surveillance].
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cases. Part V examines the arguments in favor of the inextricably
intertwined test. Finally, Part VI counters the argument that the
inextricably intertwined test violates the plain view doctrine.
I. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT ("FISA")
Under the pre-Patriot Act version of FISA, a high ranking
member of the executive branch applying for a surveillance order
from the secret FISA court ° had to certify that: (1) the informa-
tion sought was foreign intelligence information;" (2) "the
purpose' ' 2 of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence
information; and (3) such information could not reasonably be
obtained by normal investigative techniques. 3 The applicant also
had to identify the target of the surveillance, if known, and make
a preliminary showing that the target of the electronic
surveillance was a "foreign power,, 14 or an "agent of a foreign
10. FISA established a special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISC"), that meets in secret, exparteproceedings. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000).
11. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (A) (2000).
12. This provision was amended by the USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218,
115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a) (7) (B), 1823 (a)(7)(B) (2000)),
to read: "a significant purpose of the surveillance is the collection of foreign intelligence"
(emphasis added). See infra Part III.
13. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(C) (2000); seealso id. § 1805(a) (3).
14. Id. § 1801 (a). Under FISA, a "foreign power" includes:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized
by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United
States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or govern-
ments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefore;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United
States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or govern-
ments.
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power. "0 5 In addition, prior to the Patriot Act the government had
to specify, in the application, the places where the surveillance was
to be directed."
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (b) (2000) defines an "agent of a foreign power" as:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or
as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a) (4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine in-
telligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United
States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States
indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or
when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such
activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities;
or
(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or
on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation
of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or
on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to in-
volve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that
are in preparation therefore, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for
or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly as-
sumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to en-
gage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
16. The Patriot Act amended FISA to allow "roving wiretaps" which enable the surveil-
lance to follow the suspect as he switches phones. For a description of this change, see
Jeremy C. Smith, Comment, The USA PATRIOT Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National Security, 82 N.C. L. REv. 412, 416-
23 (2003). It should be noted that roving wiretaps were first authorized by some circuits in
the early 1990s. See, e.g., United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1124 (2d Cir. 1993) (inter-
preting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) (2006) as authorizing a "roving wiretap" so long as
surveillance was limited to communications involving the identified speaker and relating to
specific crimes the speaker was suspected of participating in), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1644
(1994); United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1859
(1993).
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The protections afforded a person under FISA depart substan-
tially from those under Title II11" in the following ways: (1) FISA
does not require a showing of probable cause of criminal activity;
(2) FISA only provides for limited judicial review; (3) FISA lacks an
exclusionary rule; (4) FISA provides for a significantly longer pe-
riod of surveillance; and (5) FISA does not provide notice to the
person under surveillance or give the defendant an adequate op-
portunity to challenge the certifications underlying the FISA
application.
First, the most important of these differences is the lack of prob-
able cause requirement for a FISA warrant. Title III only authorizes
electronic surveillance if the court determines, based on the sworn
testimony of a government agent, that there is probable cause that
an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit
a particular offense.8 FISA, by contrast, only requires a high-
ranking government official to certify that the target of the surveil-
lance acts on behalf of a foreign power, engages in clandestine
intelligence activities, or participates in international terrorism or
sabotage. 9 Significantly, the probable cause requirement under
Title III acts as a large hurdle that prevents the government from
pretextually utilizing wiretaps to target specific groups for whom
the government lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Second, due in part to the lack of a probable cause requirement,
FISA applications are subjected to a significantly lower level of ju-
dicial scrutiny than Title III applications. 20 The FISC will only
17. The Federal Wiretap Act (Title III), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000), was adopted in 1968
and expanded in 1986. It establishes procedures for government surveillance of voice,
email, fax, and Internet communications. Id. Under Title III, the government must obtain a
court order issued by a federal district judge who must conclude, based on an affidavit sub-
mitted by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is
being, or is about to be committed. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2006). Title III also requires the applicant to have ex-
hausted all other investigatory techniques before seeking a warrant, § 2518(3)(c), an
important requirement which is absent from FISA. This is a significant difference because
the exhaustion prerequisite obligates a Title III applicant to pursue electronic surveillance
only as a last resort when other investigatory techniques have failed. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(l)(c) (2006) (requiring a judicial determination that "normal investigative proce-
dures have failed or reasonably appear to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous").
19. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1) (2000); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(1) (2000); 50 U.S.CA.
§ 1804(a) (3) (2000).
20. If the target of the surveillance is a U.S. person, a term that includes U.S. citizens
and permanent residents, the FISCjudge must find that the certifications submitted by the
government are not clearly erroneous, and that proper procedures are followed to minimize
the intrusion on the target's privacy and to eliminate information that is not pertinent. 50
U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5) (2000); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2000); see also United States v. Duggan,
743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the government's certification "is, under FISA,
subjected to only minimal scrutiny by the courts"); H.R. RzP. No. 95-1283, at 80 (1978) (ex-
[VOL. 42:1
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scrutinize the government's application if the target is a U.S. citi-
zen and, even in cases involving U.S. citizens, the court will only
review the government's certifications for clear error.2' The clear
error standard is so deferential that it has been interpreted to pre-
vent the FISC judges from second guessing the government's• 22
assertions. The FISC judge's role, therefore, is only to evaluate
whether the application facially complies with the statutory re-.23
quirements. Moreover, when a defendant challenges the
admission of FISA evidence at his trial, the district court judge is
similarly constrained in his review and limited to evaluating "pro-
cedural regularity."
24
Third, courts have consistently declined to exclude unlawfully
seized FISA evidence 25 and, as a result, there is little to deter the
applicant from making unsupported or inaccurate assertions. Even
in cases in which, after the investigation concludes, falsehoods
have been discovered in FISA applications, the evidence obtained
from the surveillance has been deemed admissible.26
plaining that the "clearly erroneous standard of review is not, of course, comparable to a
probable cause finding by the judge").
21. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (5) (2000).
22. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77.
23. Id.
24. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 92-93 (1978) ("[I]n determining the legality of a
surveillance ... the trial judge ... [is] not to make determinations which the issuing judge is
not authorized to make. Where the bill specifies the scope or nature ofjudicial review in the
consideration of an application, any review under these subsections is similarly constrained.
For example, when reviewing the certifications required by [50 U.S.C. § 1804 (a) (7) (2000)],
unless there is a prima facie showing of a fraudulent statement by a certifying officer, proce-
dural regularity is the only determination to be made if a non-U.S. person is the
target.... ."), cited in Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77; United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1463
(lth Cir. 1987).
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(g) (2000) (containing FISA's exclusionary rule). But see United
States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that, because the exclusionary
rule did not apply in the case, any evidence obtained via unlawful surveillance would not be
suppressed); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 282-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), af'd,
United States v. Bin Laden, No. S7R 98CRIO23KTD, 2005 WL 287404, at "9-11 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 7, 2005) (admitting the FISA evidence even though the government failed to obtain the
proper authorization from the Attorney General until eight months into the surveillance);
United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 778, 788-91 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (declining to apply
the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in a physical search of the defendant's house
which was unauthorized under the 1993 version of FISA).
26. See infra notes 66-67; see also United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev.,
No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2011319, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 11, 2007) (declining to apply the
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained pursuant to a FISA application which contained
several errors); United States v. Daly, Nos. 05-10718, 05-10719, 05-10728, 05-10729, 2007 WL
2212362, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007) (holding that "[e]ven if the statements that Jamal
points to in the affidavit supporting the search warrant for his home and office were false,
he failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit's remaining content is
insufficient to establish probable cause").
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Fourth, while the data collection period is limited to thirty
days under Title 111,27 FISA surveillance may be authorized for up
to one hundred and twenty days.28 FISA also contains a provision
authorizing the Attorney General, in emergency situations, to be-
gin surveillance without a FISC order, so long as he receives FISC
approval within seven days of the initiation of the surveillance.29
Finally, under Title III, targets must be provided notice within
ninety days of the termination of the surveillance 0 and under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("FRCP"), surveillance targets
must be given immediate notice of an ordinary search warrant.2
Under FISA, however, targets are only provided notice of the sur-
veillance if the transcripts are admitted in a criminal proceeding.2
More importantly, when challenging the admissibility of FISA evi-
dence in the subsequent criminal trial, the defendant will be
denied access to the background materials that supported the FISC
order-the application, affidavits, surveillance logs, or statements
from informants-and therefore will often be unable to mount an
effective defense.33 Indeed, over the thirty-year history of FISA no
defendant has successfully challenged a FISA application, in large
part because no court has ordered the disclosure of a FISA applica-
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1) (2000). The Patriot Act extended the permissible surveil-
lance time period to up to one year when targeting a foreign power, and up to 120 days
when targeting the agent of a foreign power. Id. After the first one hundred and twenty days,
the surveillance is frequently renewed without amending or altering the original applica-
tion. In addition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008 extended this period to one year when targeting persons reasonably located outside of
the United States. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 701 (g)(1)(B), 122 Stat. 2436, 2440 (2008).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2000) (allowing the Attorney General 72 hours to seek FISC
approval after the initiation of the surveillance). This period was extended from seventy-two
hours to seven days by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008. H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. § 701 (g) (1) (B) (2008).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2006).
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (f) (1).
32. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(3), 1806(f)-(g) (2000). FISC does not publish its decisions,
its orders are sealed, and proceedings are ex parte. See id. § 1806(1).
33. Id. §§ 1806(1), 182 5 (g) (a reviewing court reviews these materials ex parte and in
camera and discloses them to the defendant "only where disclosure is necessary to make an
accurate determination of the legality of the [surveillance or physical search]"); see also
United States v. Belfield, 692 E2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (acknowledging the difficult
situation faced by a defense counsel attempting to challenge the admissibility of FISA mate-
rials: "They must argue that the determination of legality is so complex that an adversary
hearing with full access to relevant materials is necessary. But without access to the relevant
materials: their claim of complexity can be given no concreteness. It is pure assertion.");
United States v. Holy Land Found. For Relief and Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL
2011319, at *3-5 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 11, 2007) (denying Defendant's motion); United States v.
Mubayyid, No. 05-40026-FDS, 2007 WL 3287393, at *2-3 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 2007).
[VOL. 42:1
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tion to the defendant.3 4 Finally, if the FISA transcripts are not ad-
mitted at trial, the government is under no obligation to search
through its surveillance records for exculpatory material, which
deprives innocent defendants of any potential benefit from the
surveillance.35
Congress approved these departures from Title III because it in-
tended FISA to provide a practical mechanism for the executive
branch to surveil agents of foreign powers, not to provide informa-
ion for ordinar-y criminal investigations. At the same time, the
drafters of FISA recognized that intelligence gathering and law en-
forcement would overlap in the context of crimes such as
37terrorism, sabotage, and espionage. As a result, several courts
have interpreted § 1804(a) of FISA s as adopting a "primary pur-
pose" test39 which requires the executive to prove that the primary
34. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 347 F.3d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that, as
of September 14, 1988, "every FISA wiretap review had been conducted in camera and ex
partd' and that there have been "no cases since that time where the review was conducted in
any other fashion"); United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at
*19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (collecting cases finding that no court has ever ordered
disclosure of the FISA application materials); United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 588,
592 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("[T]his Court knows of no instance in which a court has required an
adversary hearing or disclosure in determining the legality of a FISA surveillance. To the
contrary, every court examining FISA-obtained evidence has conducted its review in camera
and ex pare."); see alsoJoshua L. Dratel, Sword or Shield? The Government's Selective Use of its
Declassification Authority for 7hctical Advantage in Criminal Prosecutions, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 171 (2006) (arguing that the government's power to selectively declassify
inculpatory evidence for use at trial, while, at the same time, denying the defense access to
"classified" exculpatory evidence violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and proposing
that FISA and the Classified Information Procedures Act be amended to put the govern-
ment and the defense on equal footing with regard to classified information).
35. United States v. Marcos, No. SSSS 87 CR. 598(JFK), 1990 WL 16161, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 15, 1990) (holding that the government is not required to turn over its surveillance
records to the defendant or sift through its surveillance for exculpatory evidence if it does
not intend to admit any surveillance evidence at trial).
36. See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 176 (1977) ("S. 1566 provides four limited situa-
tions in which natural persons may be made the target of an electronic surveillance without
a probable cause showing of criminal activity."); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 36 (1978) (ex-
plaining that FISA surveillances "are not primarily for the purpose of gathering evidence of
a crime. They are to obtain foreign intelligence information, which when it concerns United
States persons must be necessary to important national concerns"); see also Banks, Secret Sur-
veillance, supra note 9, at 1160 (discussing the placement of FISA in Title 50, War and
National Defense, as demonstrating congressional intent, and noting that "Congress did not
intend for FISA to in any way authorize surveillance for law enforcement purposes").
37. Banks, Secret Surveillance, supra note 9, at 1151-53.
38. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (2000) requires the executive branch official to certify
that the "purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information."
39. The primary purpose test originated in United States v. Truong, 629 E2d 908, 913-
17 (4th Cir. 1980). Truong involved surveillance conducted prior to the passage of FISA but
the decision was handed down after the passage of FISA. Id. at 914 n.4. It became an impor-
tant guidepost in the subsequentjudicial, executive and legislative interpretation of FISA. In
Truong, the Fourth Circuit determined that there was an exception to the warrant
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
purpose of the surveillance is the collection of foreign intelligence,
not the collection of evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
In response to a number of court decisions applying the Truong
primary purpose test, the Justice Department created the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review ("OIPR") to ensure institutional
responsibility for FISA compliance.4 ' From 1982 until 1995, OIPR
operated without written guidelines for law enforcement personnel
and consequently, "prosecutors had informal arrangements for ob-
taining information gathered in the FISA process."4 1 These back-
channel communications became quite common, to the point
where prosecutors were often directing the surveillance 4
In one high-profile case, the Aldrich Ames espionage prosecu-
tion, OIPR advised the Attorney General that the results of the
surveillance could be jeopardized by the close contact between law
enforcement and intelligence personnel. As a result, in 1995 At-
torney General Janet Reno laid out a series of procedures to be
followed with respect to national security wiretaps.44
Under the procedures laid out in the 1995 memo, the Criminal
Division of the Justice Department could provide the FBI with ad-
vice regarding a foreign intelligence investigation so long as it did
not inadvertently result in "either the fact or the appearance of the
requirement for national security investigations but that this exception only applied so long
as the investigation's purpose was the collection of foreign intelligence. Id. at 915. Conse-
quently, the Court determined that any evidence obtained after the investigation became
primarily focused on criminal prosecution should be excluded. Id. at 915-16.
40. See also William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1209, 1234 (2007)
[hereinafter Banks, Death of FISA]. In 2008, the OIPR came under the umbrella of the Jus-
tice Department's National Security Division and was renamed the "Office of Intelligence,"
materials available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/intelligence/intelligence.htm.
41. See id. at 1234-40 (citing Diane Carraway Piette & Jessely Radack, Piercing the "His-
torical Mists": The People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the "Wal4 " 17
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 437, 448 (2006)).
42. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's
HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 24
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 OIG REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/
0506/final.pdf.
43. See Banks, Secret Surveillance, supra note 9, at 1162; see also Banks, The Death of FISA,
supra note 40, at 1236 (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ArrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 78 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]).
44. Memorandum from the Attorney General, Procedures for Contacts Between the
FBI and Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelli-
gence Investigations (Jul. 19, 1995) (hereinafter 1995 Procedures], available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html. This Memorandum was based on rec-
ommendations from Deputy Attorney General, Jamie S. Gorelick, to Mary Jo White, Louis
Freeh, Richard Scruggs, and Jo Ann Harris in March 1995. Memorandum from Jamie S.
Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, to Mary Jo White, Louis Freeh, Richard Scruggs, and
Jo Ann Harris, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2004/1995-gorelick-memo.pdf (last
visited Nov. 8, 2008).
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Criminal Division directing or controlling an investigation." 45 In
addition, under no circumstances could the Criminal Division in-
struct the FBI "on the operation, continuation, or expansion of
FISA electronic surveillance. 46 These limitations were designed to
ensure that the government only utilized the lower standards of
FISA in cases involving threats to national security. Unfortunately,
these guidelines were strictly interpreted by OIPR lawyers to the
point where only a very limited amount of information was shared
and a wall was created between the divisions of the Justice Depart-
ment.
47
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST
The primary purpose test was a well-intentioned attempt to
achieve a difficult balance between the seemingly incongruous pol-
icy objectives of providing the government with a lower threshold
for surveillance of national security targets while protecting indi-
vidual privacy rights. 4s The primary purpose test, however, failed on
both accounts. Specifically, the wall that developed between the
Criminal Division and intelligence personnel prevented the shar-
ing of information and hindered valuable cooperation between the
two branches without providing meaningful protection for indi-
vidual rights.
According to the July 2001 General Accounting Office ("GAO")
report, friction developed within the Justice Department during
the 1990s because intelligence officials increasingly neglected to
45. 1995 Procedures, supra note 44, at A6.
46. Id.
47. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COORDINATION WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS IS LIMITED, GAO-01-780, 14 (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01780.pdf; 2004 OIG REPORT, supra note 42, at 26; THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, at 539 n.83.
48. See United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) (affirming the district
court's adoption of the primary purpose test because "once surveillance becomes primarily a
criminal investigation, the courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause
determination, and because, importantly, individual privacy interests come to the fore and
government foreign policy concerns recede when the government is primarily attempting to
form the basis for a criminal prosecution."); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d
Cir. 1974) (holding that, when ajudge determines that foreign intelligence gathering is the
"primary purpose" of a particular search and that "the accumulation of evidence of criminal
activity [from that search] was incidental," an exception to the warrant requirement exists
for the foreign intelligence gathering because "the need for electronic surveillance often
cannot be anticipated in advance" and the public interest in foreign intelligence cases is
greater than normal criminal cases); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 656-57 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (rejecting the government's argument that warrantless surveillance of a domestic
organization [the Jewish Defense League] could be reasonable solely because "some infor-
mation relevant.. to foreign affairs [was] likely to be obtained from the surveillance").
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share information with the Criminal Division under the mistaken
belief that providing such information to law enforcement person-
nel would cause the FISC to reject applications to renew electronic
surveillance of national security targets. Intelligence officials fun-
damentally misunderstood the primary purpose test to mean
exclusive purpose 5' and consequently shared almost no informa-
tion with criminal prosecutors. On the other side of the wall, a
desire to preserve the option of prosecution caused law enforce-
ment officials to avoid any communication in those cases in which
cooperation was the most crucial-cases in which evidence of for-
eign intelligence crimes had already been generated."' Moreover,
the "wall" between criminal and intelligence investigations appar-
ently "caused agents [in both divisions] to be less aggressive than
they might otherwise have been in pursuing [FISA] surveillance
,,52powers in counterterrorism investigations.
After 9/11, the Bush administration and many commentators
blamed the failure to detect the terrorist plot on the FISA wall.
For example, in the joint hearings investigating the September
11th hijackings, a New York FBI agent testified that "the Wall's"
restrictions prevented the FBI from obtaining information from
the intelligence community regarding Khalid A1-Mihdar and Nawaf
Al-Hazmi (who later turned out to be two of the September 11th
54hijackers). The most prominent intelligence failure blamed on
the FISA wall was the inability of FBI investigators to obtain a war-
49. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 47, at 14.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST AT-rACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATE-
MENT No. 9: LAW ENFORCEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN
THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 9/11 7 (2004), available at http://www.9-1Icommission.gov/
stafLstatements/staffLstatemen t_9.pdf.
53. Jennifer L. Sullivan, From "The Purpose" to "A Significant Purpose": Assessing the Consti-
tutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Under the Fourth Amendment, 19 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 379, 397 (2005) [hereinafter Sullivan] (arguing that the failure to
obtain a FISA warrant on Moussaoui and his computer stemmed from the failure to dis-
seminate the "Phoenix Memo" to other FBI branches and "arguably [was] a major reason
for the inability of law enforcement to detect and prevent the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks"); see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 747 n.29 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (recounting
the testimony of a senior FBI agent who argued that "the biggest threat to us now, [Usama
Bin Laden], is getting the most 'protection.' ").
54. See Jessica M. Bungard, The Fine Line Between Security and Liberty: The Secret Court
Struggle to Determine the Path of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance in the Wake of September lth, 7 U.
Ptrr.J. TECH. L. & POL'v, Spring 2004, at 1, 13, n.54 (2004) [hereinafter Bungard] (citing
Prepared Statement of a New York Special Agent Before the United States Senate and the
House of Representatives (Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2002_hr/092002fbi.html).
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rant to search Zacarias Moussaoui's computer when they detained
him in Minneapolis for overstaying his tourist visa.56 FBI "Head-
quarters also prohibited the field agents from notifying the
Headquarters Criminal Division, fearing that any interest ex-
pressed in a criminal warrant and prosecution could jeopardize the
chances of obtaining a FISA order., 57 Yet, at the same time, FBI
headquarters did not pursue a FISA warrant because it believed it
lacked sufficient evidence demonstrating that Moussaoui was an
agent of a foreign power.58 As a result, Moussaoui's computer was
never searched and the terrorist plot never discovered. Therefore,
it should come as no surprise that one commentator argued that:
"[e]very major recent review of U.S. intelligence policy and organi-
zation [since 9/11] has called for increased information sharing,
unity of command and control, and removal of barriers to joint
and complementary action among U.S. government departments
and agencies. ,59 While these criticisms of FISA were certainly
55. Moussaoui is alleged to have been the "20th hijacker," one of the alleged master-
minds behind the September 11 th attacks. During his trial, Moussaoui repeatedly stated that
he was not involved in the September 11 attacks, but that he was planning an attack of his
own.
56. Banks, Secret Surveillance, supra note 9, at 1164-65; see also Memorandum from
Coleen Rowley, Agent of the FBI, to Robert S. Mueller, Director of the FBI, (May 21, 2002),
available at http://www.time.com/ time/ covers/1101020603/memo.html; Jerry Markon &
Timothy Dwyer, FBI Was Warned About Moussaoui; Agent Tells Court Of Repeated Efforts Before
9/11 Attacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2006, at A01; Peggy Noonan, Weenies or Moles: Did the FBI
bungle the Moussaoui investigation---or worse?, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2002, http://www.
opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110001778; Heather MacDonald, Why the
FBI Didn't Stop 9/11, CITY J., Autumn 2002, at 14, available at http://www.city-
journal.org/html/12_4_whythejfbi.html; Gary Schmitt, Constitutional Spying: The Solution to
the FISA Problem, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 2-Jan. 9, 2006, at 11, 11, available
at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/533bcrdq.asp;
William Kristol & Gary Schmitt, Vital Presidential Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2005, at
A31, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/19/
AR2005121901027.html. But see Coleen Rowley, ESA Not to Blame for Moussaoui Mess, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/coleen-rowley/fisa-not-to-
blame-for-moub_13310.html (disputing that FISA safeguards were to blame for the FBI's
failure to obtain a search warrant for Moussaoui's computer).
57. Banks, Secret Surveillance, supra note 9, at 1164; see also REPORT OF THE JOINT IN-
QUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATrACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REP. No. 107-351, at xiii,
318-24 (2002), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport.
errata.pdf (discussing the mistaken view of agents involved in the Moussaoui investigation
regarding the showing necessary to obtain a FISA warrant).
58. Banks, Secret Surveillance, supra note 9, at 1165.
59. Fred F. Manget, Intelligence and The Criminal Law System, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv.
415, 420 (2006) (citing, e.g., COMM'N ON INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARD-
ING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (THE WMD COMMISSION), REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
(2005); 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43; S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & H.
PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMtU-
NITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATrACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S.
REP. No. 107-351, H. REP. No. 107-792, 2d Sess. (2002); COMM'N ON ROLES AND
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overstated ° in the campaign for expanded surveillance powers
immediately after 9/11, the confusion generated by the FISA wall
hindered the sharing of intelligence necessary for the early detec-
tion of terrorist plots.61
The primary purpose test also failed to accomplish its driving
goal of protecting First and Fourth Amendment rights. The lack of
any probable cause requirement for a FISC order and the low
standard of judicial review for assertions in FISA applications essen-
tially gave law enforcement personnel carte blanche to obtain FISA
warrants against anyone.62 Indeed, FISC was called the "rubberstamp
court" by many members of the intelligence community,63 probably
due to the fact that between 1979 and 2001 FISC approved all
14,036 applications submitted by the Executive branch.64 The fact
that FISC never turned down an application in the first twenty-three
years of its existence 65 is especially troublesome given the revelation
CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CMTY. (THE ASPIN-BROWN COMMISSION), PREPAR-
ING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE (1996)).
60. But see, e.g., SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY ET AL., INTERIM REPORT ON FBI OVERSIGHT IN
THE 107TH CONGRESS BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITIEE: FISA IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES
15-21, 33, 35-36 (2003), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2003/p03r02-25c.pdf.
This report identified "a failure to analyze and disseminate information within the FBI's pos-
session" as well as a misunderstanding regarding the proper legal standard necessary for a FISA
warrant as the true causes of the failure to detect Moussaoui's ultimate intentions. Id. at 6.
Indeed, the report blamed a cumbersome FBI bureaucracy, an ineffective computer system
which prevented agents from searching case files for key words, and a "deep rooted culture
of ignoring problems" within the FBI as the primary barriers to cooperation and effective
intelligence sharing. Id.; see also Banks, Secret Surveillance, supra note 9, at 1150 ("Largely lost
in the rush to supply correctives to the failures in information-sharing and cooperation in
the weeks and months after September 11 was the reality that laws were responsible only in a
limited way for erecting a wall to effective inter-agency or law enforcement/intelligence
community information-sharing. An institutional tradition hostile to coordination in large
part created the wall." (citation omitted)); 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, at 273-
76 (identifying a failure to share information between the various intelligence agencies as
one cause of 9/11 but refusing to blame any shortcomings in investigating Moussaoui on the
FISA purpose requirement); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 531, 535-36 (2006) (stating that "most of the
bureaucratic obstacles had nothing to do with FISA, and some of the segmentation attrib-
uted to FISA was in fact the product of unrelated agency practices").
61. See supra notes 49-52.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47 (outlining the requirements contained in
Attorney General Janet Reno's 1995 memorandum which later became known as the FISA
wall).
63. See Bungard, supra note 54, at 2.
64. See Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the
Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INrr'L L.J. 1234 (2003) (compiling the results from the an-
nual reports of the Attorney General from 1979 to 2001, available at http://fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fisa).
65. FISC turned down no applications from 1979 to 2002 and has only turned down
nine applications from 2003 to 2007. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-2002, http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-
stats.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2008); see also Bungard, supra note 54, at 2; Nola K. Breglio,
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in 2002 that the Justice Department admittedly knew of at least
seventy-five instances where it provided false or misleading infor-
mation in order to obtain approval for surveillance. Significantly,
one FBI agent was barred from appearing before the FISC due to
repeated misstatements67 and the person responsible for reviewing
all FISA applications and summarizing this information for the
benefit of the Attorney General was convicted of cocaine posses-
sion and making false statements.
6s
The primary purpose test also failed to confine the discretion of
the executive to utilize FISA in criminal prosecutions unrelated to
national security.6 The concept underlying the test was that offi-
cers would be unable to utilize FISA surveillance in a criminal
prosecution unless the discovery of the criminal evidence was
Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113
YALE L.J. 179, 188 n.54 (2003); Federation of American Scientists, Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act, FISA Annual Reports to Congress, http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (last
visited Nov. 8, 2008).
66. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 620 (FISA Ct. 2002); see alo Letter from William D. Delahunt, House Repre-
sentative from Massachusetts, to Robert S. Mueller, Director of the FBI (June 14, 2002),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/del061402.pdf; Letter from M.E. Bow-
man, Deputy General Counsel for National Security Affairs, Office of the General Counsel,
to Congressman William Delahunt (Aug. 7, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/ec.pdf.
67. See In re All Matters Submitted, 218 E Supp. 2d at 621.
68. United States v. Barr, 963 E2d 641, 644-46 (3rd Cir. 1992).
69. For over twenty-four years, from 1978 to 2001, the federal courts universally up-
held FISA as an adequate substitute for a criminal warrant, satisfying the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement, because of the government's "special needs" in
national security investigations. See In re Sealed Case, 310 E3d 717, 737 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)
("Senator Leahy believed that '[n]o matter what statutory change is made.., the court may
impose a constitutional requirement of "primary purpose" based on the appellate court
decisions upholding FISA against constitutional challenges over the past 20 years.'' (quot-
ing 147 Cong. Rec. S11003 (Oct. 25, 2001)); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 E2d 59, 73
(2d Cir. 1984) ("procedures established in [FISA] are reasonable in relation to legitimate
foreign counterintelligence requirements and the protected rights of individuals" and there-
fore are constitutional); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987). However, these courts viewed
this exception to the Fourth Amendment as applicable only if the government's primary
purpose was national security collection. See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572
(1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Badia, 827 E2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Pelton, 835 E2d 1067, 1075-76 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. United States District Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972); see also THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, S. REP. No. 98-660, at 15 (1984) ("[T]he Justice De-
partment should use Title III when it is clear that the main concern with respect to a
terrorist group is domestic law enforcement and criminal prosecution, even if the surveil-
lance will also produce some foreign intelligence information."); Banks, Secret Surveillance,
supra note 9, at 1160 (discussing the placement of FISA in Title 50, War and National De-
fense, as demonstrating congressional intent and noting that "Congress did not intend for
FISA to in any way authorize surveillance for law enforcement purposes").
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inadvertent.7 0 In practice, however, the primary purpose test did
not result in a searching judicial inquiry into the subjective motiva-
tions of the law enforcement personnel conducting the search and
no court suppressed evidence generated from FISA surveillance.'
The primary purpose test lacked teeth for two fundamental rea-
sons. First, courts were ill-equipped to evaluate the subjective
motivations of officers conducting surveillance7 2 and preferred to
draw bright line rules. In this case, the bright line "wall" estab-
lished by Janet Reno's 1995 procedures satisfied most courts.
Second, the primary purpose test rested "on a false premise" that
foreign intelligence gathering is entirely distinct from criminal in-
vestigation.75 The line developed in the Truong case was "inherently
70. See Gregory E. Birkenstock, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards of
Probable Cause: An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 861 (1992) ("When FISA was being
drafted, the Judiciary Committee expected 'relatively few' cases in which materials
unearthed under FISA would be used as evidence in criminal prosecutions."); S. REP.
No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 52-53 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3954 ("[U]ses to
be made of the [FISA] information acquired by means of this chapter [must] be carefully
restricted.").
71. See supra notes 64-65. None of the cases interpreting FISA from 1978 to 2001
found the primary purpose of the surveillance to be criminal prosecution and excluded
evidence on this basis; see, e.g., United States v. Sarkissian, 841 E2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988)
(declining to decide whether the test is one of purpose or primary purpose and refusing "to
draw too fine a distinction between criminal and intelligence investigations. 'International
terrorism,' by definition, requires the investigation of activities that constitute crimes.");
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987); Badia, 827 F.2d at 1464 (holding that
"the telephone surveillance of Arocena did not have as its purpose the primary objective of
investigating a criminal act. Rather, surveillance was sought for the valid purpose of acquir-
ing foreign intelligence information."); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir.
1984) (stating that "the requirement that foreign intelligence information be the primary
objective of the surveillance is plain not only from the language of § 1802(b) but also from
the requirement in § 1804 as to what the application must contain." In this case, however,
the primary purpose test was satisfied because "otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not
tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the fruits of such surveillance
may later be used, as allowed by § 1806(b), as evidence in a criminal trial."); United States v.
Rahman, 861 E Supp. 247, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("There is no contradiction, indeed there
probably is often a congruence, between foreign intelligence information and evidence of
criminal wrongdoing. That does not mean the government may not avail itself of FISA in
order to protect national security when to do so will also generate evidence that may be used
in a criminal case."); United States v.Johnson, CRIM. A. No. 89-221-MA, 1990 WL 78522 (D.
Mass. Apr. 13, 1990); In re Matter of Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 788
F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the primary purpose test was satisfied by the evidence
in this case); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (upholding the
use of electronic surveillance evidence "[wihen, therefore, the President has, as his primary
purpose, the accumulation of foreign intelligence information") (emphasis added).
72. Fourth Amendment inquiries typically ignore the subjective motivation of the offi-
cer involved in the search. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding
that the constitutionality of a traffic stop does not depend upon the subjective intent of the
officer). As discussed below, the requirement that the officer "inadvertently" discover evi-
dence in the context of "plain view" searches, was vitiated by Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 138-42 (1990).
73. In reSealed Case, 310 F3d 717, 743 (FISACt. Rev. 2002).
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unstable, unrealistic, and confusing"74 because it was impossible to
separate gathering intelligence and fighting national security
crimes.7 5 A typical foreign intelligence investigation begins with the
FBI keeping tabs on foreign groups even though the FBI may lack
probable cause of any anticipated criminal activity. At some point,
the surveillance may generate evidence of a foreign intelligence
crime such as espionage or terrorism but this does not transform
the purpose of the surveillance. Indeed, protecting national secu-
rity and detecting crimes often go hand-in-hand; terrorism is
defined by FISA as violent activity which "would be a criminal viola-
tion if committed within ... the United States or any State. 76 In
most cases, it will be impossible to determine the point at which
the government decides that criminal prosecution is the appropri-
ate means of proceeding. Finally, the increased criminalization of
77terrorism-related crimes in recent years makes it more difficult to
parse the government's objectives in any particular case.78
III. THE PATRIOT ACT AND THE SHIFT TO A
"SIGNIFICANT PURPOSE" TEST
Only six weeks after the September l1th attacks, President
George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act 9 and authorized a series of
74. Id.
75. Id. (Those cases implementing the "primary purpose" test relied on "the false
premise... that once the government moves to criminal prosecution, its 'foreign policy
concerns' recede .... [C]riminal prosecutions can be, and usually are, interrelated with
other techniques used to frustrate a foreign power's efforts. Indeed, .. . 'almost all foreign
intelligence investigations are in part criminal investigations."' (quoting United States v.
Truong, 629 E2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980))).
76. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000).
77. NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 5-7 (1st ed.
2005) (arguing that in the years since FISA was implemented, Congress has criminalized
more and more national security and terrorism-related conduct, adding hundreds of new
offenses to the federal criminal code).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Sarkissian, 841 E2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to
affirm the primary purpose test because the distinction between foreign intelligence surveil-
lance and criminal investigations is almost immaterial and acts of international terrorism
ultimately entail criminal investigations because terrorism is also a criminal offense).
79. Critics of the Patriot Act have argued that the rush to "do something" led to a lack
of thoughtful debate and adequate consideration of the monumental changes being en-
acted. See David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA
Patriot Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 291, 319
(2003) ("Given the magnitude of the USA PATRIOT Act in affecting our civil liberties, how-
ever, the time and scrutiny afforded this historical legislation raises concerns of its legitimacy
and constitutionality .... Just 36 days after the legislation's introduction, Congress 'rubber-
stamped' it after making only minor alterations. The rush to pass the bill was so swift that on
the day the House had its final debate, members complained that they did not have a
chance to read the final version." (internal citations omitted)).
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sweeping changes undermining the balance between individual
rights and government power embodied in the original 1978 FISA
statute.80 Not only did the Patriot Act authorize roving wiretaps,
internet tracking, and "sneak-and-peek"81 searches, but it also re-
moved any teeth from the Truong primary purpose test.s2 Prior to
the Patriot Act, the applicant had to certify that the "the purpose
of the surveillance [was] the collection of foreign intelligence," but
after the Patriot Act's amendments to FISA, the applicant only had
to certify that "a significant purpose of the surveillance is the col-
lection of foreign intelligence." 3 Congress made clear its intention
to break down the "primary purpose" wall by specifically authoriz-
ing the sharing of information between intelligence and law
enforcement officials without OIPR supervision.84
Shortly after the passage of the Patriot Act, Attorney General
John Ashcroft issued a memorandum in March 2002 explicitly re-
pudiating the 1995 guidelines and allowing prosecutors to "direct
85and control" FISA surveillance. In a subsequent appeal to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR"), the
secret FISA review court approved the Attorney General's proce-
80. Stephanie Kornblum, Note, Winning the Battle While Losing the War: Ramifications of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review's First Decision, 27 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 623,624
(2003) ("Prohibiting that interaction [between law enforcement and foreign intelligence
officials] is one way in which the statute seeks to balance individual liberties while providing
the government the ability to conduct surreptitious surveillances, an invaluable tool in
terrorism and espionage investigations."); see also Banks, Death of FISA, supra note 40, at 1215
(" [T] he central premise of the FISA compromise-authorizing secret electronic surveillance
for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, but subjecting applications to judicial
scrutiny and the entire process to congressional oversight has been lost." (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(f) (2006))); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1306, 1325 (2004) (stating that the 1978 FISA "revealed a grand com-
promise between advocates for civil liberties and the intelligence community").
81. A "sneak-and-peak" search warrant authorizes law enforcement officers to enter a
private premises, without the owner or occupant's permission or knowledge and clandes-
tinely search the premises and seize any materials found within the premises. See USA
PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 285-86 (2001) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103(a) (2006)).
82. See Kornblum, supra note 80, at 627 ("This seemingly small change in wording has
potentially great impact. FISA's relaxed probable cause requirement was previously reserved
for situations where the only purpose was foreign intelligence gathering. The new wording
allows the government to avoid the normal probable cause required to obtain a warrant in a
criminal investigation.").
83. USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (amend-
ing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a) (7) (B), 1823(a) (7) (B) (2000)).
84. Id. § 504 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k) (West Supp. 2002)).
85. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, to Director of the FBI,
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, and
United States Attorneys, (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
fisa/ag03O6O2.html.
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dures. 6 The court concluded: "[t] he addition of the word 'signifi-
cant' to section 1804(a) (7) (B) imposed a requirement that the
government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other
than just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence
crim es. "8
The FISCR court's reading of the significant purpose test only
requires the government to retain "a realistic option of dealing
with the agent other than through criminal prosecution ", 8 and, as a
result, the government will likely satisfy this test in every case.89 It is
extremely difficult to conceive of a case in which the government is
monitoring a person and yet would not have a measurable foreign
intelligence purpose even if criminal prosecution is inevitable. °
For example, the government would have a "measurable foreign
intelligence purpose" if prosecutors indict the target with the hope
they can turn the target into a valuable informant. Alternatively,
the government may be ready to proceed with prosecution but wait
to see if the target accidentally reveals other sources or contacts.
The inadequacy of the "significant purpose" standard is further
compounded by the fact that a court deciding whether to admit
evidence gathered pursuant to a FISA warrant in a criminal pro-
ceeding can only review the FISC determination of the purpose of
the surveillance for "clear error."9 '
Critics of the shift to the "significant purpose" test deride it as
creating an "end run" around the Fourth Amendment, allowing
prosecutors to avoid the constitutionally mandated protections of
Title III simply by certifying that the target of the surveillance is an
86. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d. 717, 730 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
87. Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. See O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 64, at 1262-63 ("The FISCR has effectively
told us that the Constitution need not control the conduct of criminal surveillance in the
United States."); George P. Varghese, A Sense of Purpose: The Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385, 429 (2003) ("On November 18, 2002, the
FISCR granted the government a new and incredibly powerful tool in the war on terror at
the expense of the Fourth Amendment. By upholding the Patriot Act and the 2002 Proce-
dures, the FISCR permitted, for the first time, the use of the foreign intelligence exception
to bypass the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens targeted in law enforcement investiga-
tions.").
90. See Hardin, supra note 79, at 343 ("[T]he new foreign intelligence purpose stan-
dard disables the FISC or any other court from ascertaining the existence of a foreign
intelligence purpose in light of the ambiguity inherent in the term 'significant' and the
broad nature of acts that may lead to probable cause under FISA2").
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (5) (2000); see, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 861 E Supp. 247,
251 (S.D.N.Y 1994) (stating that "a reviewing court is not to 'second-guess' the [govern-
ment's] certification" that the primary purpose of the surveillance is the collection of
foreign intelligence information).
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agent of a foreign power.92 For the first time, during the 2003 and
2004 calendar year, the number of surveillance orders granted un-
der FISA exceeded the number granted under Title III, providing
some factual support for the claim that FISA will gradually replace
Title III as the primary vehicle for authorizing surveillance. 93 Even
the FISC court has noted: "lIt] he 2002 procedures appear to be de-
signed to amend the law and substitute FISA for Title III electronic
surveillances and Rule 41 searches. This may be because the gov-
ernment is unable to meet the substantive requirements of these
law enforcement tools.
9 4
In the context of certain crimes, such as espionage, sabotage
and terrorism, the pretextual use of FISA to gather evidence pri-
marily intended for use in a criminal trial may seem like a minor
concern. After all, pretextual surveillance will only detect evidence
of crimes that are being committed, and the government's interest
in preventing terrorism, sabotage, and espionage is clearly para-
mount. A major concern, however, should be FISA's specific
92. See, e.g., Petition for Leave to Intervene and Petition for a Writ of Certiorari of
American Civil Liberties Union et al., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)
(No. 02-001) [hereinafter ACLU Petition]; O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 64; Risa Ber-
kower, Note, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of Administrative Subpoenas in
Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2251, 2280-87 (2005);James x. Dempsey & Lara
M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1459, 1492 (2004)
("The fear is that having developed an effective and justified analytic tool and gained access
to commercial sources of information for counterterrorism purposes, an agency or other
agencies will then seek to use the information for purposes extending beyond counterter-
rorism, purposes that on their own would not have supported access to the information, but
that seem to offer benefits at a marginal cost once the information is available.").
93. While it is certainly true that this increase may be a result of an increased number
of terrorism investigations, it also supports the argument that FISA is being used in some
borderline cases. See Nicholas Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Protecting the Civil
Liberties that Make Defense of our Nation Worthwhile, 35 Sw. U. L. REv. 361, 394 (2006) [herein-
after Whilt] (compiling the results of Administration Office of the U.S. Cts); see also Letter
from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2003rept.pdf (reporting that during the 2003
calendar year, the FISC approved 1,724 FISA applications); Letter from William E. Mo-
schella, Assistant Attorney General, to Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, United States
House of Representatives, (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
fisa/2004rept.pdf (reporting that during the 2004 calendar year, the FISC approved 1,754
applications to conduct FISA surveillance); Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 2004 Wiretap Report, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap04/contents.html
(reporting that during the 2004 calendar year, the federal courts approved 1,710 applica-
tions to conduct surveillance under Title III).
94. In reAll Matters Submitted, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 623 (FISA Ct. 2002). The court
further hypothesized that prosecutors, who can now direct and control a FISA investigation,
may seek a FISA warrant in ordinary criminal cases when they lack probable cause; "criminal
prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps when they lack probable cause for a
Title III electronic surveillance), what techniques to use, what information to look for, what
information to keep as evidence." Id. at 624.
[VOL. 42:1
FALL 2008] Shu'ubiyya or Security?
authorization of the use of FISA surveillance evidence in criminal
prosecutions of non-foreign intelligence crimes.'5 As a result, a law
enforcement person could circumvent the constitutional protec-
tions of Title III by obtaining a FISA warrant, without probable
cause, to prosecute a person suspected only of "ordinary" criminal
activity.96
One fear is that FISA will be used pretextually to target inno-
cent Arab-Americans and Muslims and that the evidence obtained
from FISA surveillance will be used disproportionately to prosecute
these minority groups for drug crimes, gun possession, immigra-
tion violations, and minor crimes. Another worry is that FISA could
be used to target political opponents, thereby chilling political
speech.
Even if the "significant purpose" test is satisfied in every case, the
government must still certify that the FISA target is the "agent of a
foreign power."9' This requirement, however, is also easily satisfied.
Under 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (b), 9' a person can qualify as an agent of a
foreign power if he (1) acts as a member of a foreign power; (2)
knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering which may
involve a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or in the case of
95. FISA specifically authorizes the retention of information that is "evidence of a
crime," 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (h)(3) (2000), and provides procedures for the retention and dis-
semination of such information. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b)-(f) (2000). There is no requirement
that the "crime" be related to foreign intelligence and courts have allowed the use of FISA
materials in prosecutions of non-foreign intelligence crimes. See United States v. Wen, 477
E3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2007) ("If, while conducting this surveillance, agents discover evi-
dence of a domestic crime, they may use it to prosecute for that offense. That the agents
may have known that they were likely to hear evidence of domestic crime does not make the
interception less reasonable than if they were ignorant of this possibility. Justice Stewart's
position that the plain-view doctrine is limited to 'inadvertent' discoveries, has not carried
the day."); United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1302, 1304-06 (8th Cir. 1991) (admitting evi-
dence obtained during FISA surveillance in an unrelated murder prosecution); United
States v. Hawamda, No. 89-56-A, 1989 WL 235836, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 1989) ("[W]hen a
monitoring agent overhears evidence of domestic criminal activity, it wotld be a subversion
of his oath of office if he did not forward that information to the proper prosecuting au-
thorities.").
96. Cf Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-68 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(arguing that if the police know that they can use legal authority to search for one thing as a
way of looking for another thing, they may embark on pretextual searches and fishing expe-
ditions); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1990) (rejecting a subjective intent test
for the plain view exception but recognizing that the possibility of officers using plain view
to execute pretextual searches is a legitimate Fourth Amendment concern).
97. Although, as a result of the FISA Amendment of 2008, even this requirement is
inapplicable in the context of surveillance of persons reasonably believed to be located
outside of the United States. See H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. § 702(b) (2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h6304e
nr.txt.pdf.
98. See supra note 15.
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non-U.S. persons' circumstances indicate that he may engage in
clandestine intelligence gathering; or (3) knowingly engages in
international terrorism or sabotage.00 While this definition appears
to limit FISA surveillance to a narrow range of people, in reality its
broad terms capture quite a large group of people.'0 ' A "foreign
power," for example, includes a component of a foreign govern-
ment, a foreign political organization, or an entity that is directed
or controlled by a foreign government.0 2 "International terrorism"
is defined as "violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State." 13 In addition, the Patriot Act's "lone wolf' provision essen-
tially qualifies any non-citizen, acting alone, as an "agent of a
foreign power.', 0 4 Based on this provision, "suspected terrorists may
be targeted under FISA even if there is no proof of a connection to
any terrorist group or a foreign power.'
0 5
These amorphous definitions cover such a broad range of activ-
ity that overzealous law enforcement personnel will have little
trouble fitting U.S. citizens into one of the aforementioned catego-
ries.'06 Finally, non-U.S. citizens are afforded no protection under
FISA because the FISC judges cannot question or scrutinize the
99. The term "U.S. persons" includes both U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents
of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (i) (2000).
100. See supra note 15.
101. See, e.g., O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 64, at 1258 ("The first thing that should
be apparent is the incredible breadth of these definitions.... The terms used above include
definitions of criminal behavior so broad, as to encompass any violation of the criminal
statutes of the United States, and any violent act which would violate the criminal law of the
United States or any State.").
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (a) (2000).
103. Id. § 1801(c).
104. As amended, the "[a]gent of a foreign power" may include any person, other than
a United States person, who "engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefore." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1) (C) (2000); see ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004:
"LONE WOLF" AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS22011.pdf.
105. Banks, Death of FISA, supra note 40, at 1274 ("[I]n the post-September 11 era,
where supposed links to al Qaeda are legion, the tendency to rely on FISA to investigate
even the most speculative suspicions of a connection to international terrorism by lone
wolves could turn EISA surveillance into a quotidian occurrence.").
106. See O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 64, at 1258 (arguing that the definition of in-
ternational terrorism is broad enough to capture any criminal violation and therefore
provides no safeguard against the pretextual use of FISA); Varghese, supra note 89, at 427
(arguing that "[t]he statutory definition leaves open the possibility that a U.S. citizen may be
involved in clandestine intelligence activities that do not involve criminal conduct at all" and
that "while the statute clearly contemplates crimes like espionage, any violation of the
criminal statutes, no matter how minor, would fall within its definition"); see also United
States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984) (defendants argued that FISA allowed surveil-
lance of persons "who may be engaging in activities that 'may' violate United States law").
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assertions of the executive branch and therefore, they simply re-
view the application for procedural regularity.0 7 It is almost
impossible to conceptualize a situation in which a FISC judge will
find an application to be "clearly erroneous" during an ex parte
proceeding; to date, no applicant has been successful in challeng-
ing a FISA application in the subsequent criminal proceeding.
0 8
These expansive definitions, coupled with the history of false
statements, omissions, and mischaracterizations of evidence by
FISA applicants, certainly lend credibility to the claim that, without
the safeguards provided by the primary purpose test, FISA will in-
creasingly be used as a way to circumvent the strict requirements of
Title III.
Non-U.S. citizens and American citizens of foreign descent will
likely be the people most frequently ensnared by the over-breadth
of these definitions."J The definition of a foreign agent is designed
to be easier to satisfy in the case of aliens and there is no judicial
review of the executive's certifications provided for non-U.S. citi-
zens."" In addition, the FISA Amendment of 2008 enables the
government to monitor the communications of any person "rea-
sonably believed to be located outside of the United States"
without presenting any evidence that this person is "an agent of a
foreign power.".' The amorphous restrictions on this loophole
make it likely that anytime a U.S. citizen places an international
call or sends an international email, they are forfeiting some
107. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Isa, 923 E2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Badia,
827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987); Duggan, 743 F.2d 59; United States v. Holy Land Found. for
Relief and Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2011319 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2007); United
States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006); United States v.Jamal, 285 F. Supp. 2d
1221 (D. Ariz. 2003); United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
109. For example, Senator Russ Feingold, (D-Wisconsin), the only Senator to vote
against the Patriot Act, said: "[W]ho do we think is most likely to bear the brunt of the
abuse? It won't be immigrants from Ireland, it won't be immigrants from El Salvador or
Nicaragua, it won't even be immigrants from Haiti or Africa. It will be immigrants from
Arab, Muslim and South Asian countries. In the wake of these terrible events our govern-
ment has been given vast new powers and they may fall most heavily on a minority of our
population who already feel particularly acutely the pain of this disaster." Robert N. Davis,
Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 175, 217 (2003)
(citing Sen. Russell Feingold, Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Bill, (Oct. 25, 2002), Electronic
Privacy Information Center, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/
feingold.html).
110. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5) (2000); see also United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180,
1198-1200 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, Duggan, 743 F.2d at 75-77 (rejecting the defendant's ar-
gument that the different treatment of aliens and non-aliens is a violation of equal
protection).
111. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, § 701 (g) (1) (B), 122 Stat. 2436, 2440 (2008).
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Fourth Amendment protection. This new amendment seems
most likely to result in increased surveillance of recent immigrants
and other residents with ties to foreigners. It also seems logical to
assume that the government is more likely to seek FISA warrants
for the surveillance of Muslim and Arab citizens. A Muslim citizen
who belongs to a religious organization or a semi-political group
could be classified as being a "member" of a "foreign political
organization." 13 In Zweibon v. Mitchell, the court noted that even
limiting warrantless surveillance to cases involving agents of for-
eign powers would fail to protect First Amendment rights because
"under such a test, a few alien members in a political organization
would justify surveillance of the conversations of all members.""
4
The court offered as an example its view that, under such a test,
antiwar organizations sponsoring speeches by South Vietnamese
political dissenters during the 1960's could have been wiretapped
without a warrant."5 This discriminatory abuse of the government's
power to search and surveil its citizens was exactly the type of prac-
tice the Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit.'
1 6
The potential for abuse of this broad discretion becomes espe-
cially worrisome in cases involving the intersection of political
speech, religion, and race. The targeting of members of pro-
Palestinian political groups is one example."7 As discussed above,
FISA does not define the term "clandestine intelligence gathering"
112. The government is required to certify that they are not intentionally targeting a
person located within the United States and adopt targeting procedures to ensure that they
are "targeting" persons located outside the United States and to prevent the intentional
acquisition of calls between two persons in the United States. § 702(d)-(e). The FISC court
also reviews these procedures to ensure that they contain all the requisite elements and that
the targeting procedures are reasonable. § 702(i). These requirements do not, however,
prevent the government from monitoring calls made by U.S. citizens located in the United
States to persons reasonably located outside of the United States, so long as the government
is targeting the non-U.S. citizen.
113. See Grayson A. Hoffman, Note, The New FISA Regime, The Wall, and the Fourth
Amendment, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1655, 1674 (2003) (demonstrating that "a federal prosecu-
tor theoretically could secure a FISA surveillance order to monitor an American citizen
residing in the United States who joined a pro-Palestinian movement with a history of stag-
ing violent protests. The prosecutor could seek FISA surveillance on the basis that, inter alia,
the target's behavior 'may involve' criminal activity.").
114. 516 F.2d 594, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
115. Id.
116. See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94-95 (Johns Hopkins Press ed., 1937).
117. See Whilt, supra note 93, at 393 ("This is problematic because a United States citi-
zen could be a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, or a foreign website where
members discuss political views, and such an organization would qualify as 'a foreign based
political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons.' As such, the
members could be considered engaged in 'clandestine intelligence gathering activities' for
conducting legitimate research ... to learn about U.S. policy toward their political views.").
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and its definition of international terrorism includes legal activity
that "may" constitute a crime. 8 Therefore, the opportunity exists
for law enforcement personnel to target political opponents for
activity the government considers to be the "gathering of intelli-
gence" or for advocating a change in existing foreign policy." 9
Even without imputing evil motives to the government, it is easy to
imagine a reporter communicating with sources in Afghanistan or
Iraq being identified by the TSA data-mining program as a poten-
tial threat and this alone warranting a FISA wiretap.2 Equally
distressing is the chilling effect these vague definitions may have
on constitutionally protected political speech. The ACLU, in its
brief to the FISCR, argued: "[e]xpanding the circumstances in
which the government may invade the individual's protected
sphere without probable cause also presents the danger that the
government's surveillance power will chill dissent, and indeed that
the government may wield its power with the specific intent of
chilling dissent."02 1 The Supreme Court has recognized that: (1)
the executive will be inclined to target political opponents; and (2)
if people know that their government can spy on them without
probable cause they will almost certainly chill their dissenting po-
litical speech. 2 2 Indeed, the executive abuses in targeting political
118. Varghese, supra note 89, at 420 ("The statutory definition leaves open the possibil-
ity that a U.S. citizen may be involved in clandestine intelligence activities that do not
involve criminal conduct at all.").
119. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 635 n.107 (arguing that under the permissive definition of an
"agent of a foreign power," "even a domestic political leader could be wiretapped without a
warrant if the Government believed he had wittingly or unwittingly become the 'agent' of a
foreign power").
120. For example, Lawrence Wright, author of The Looming Tower, a Pulitzer Prize-
winning book on al-Qaeda, reported that two members of an FBI terrorism task force
showed up at his house in 2002 while he was researching the book and interrogated him
regarding his daughter's alleged communications with al-Qaeda operatives. It later became
clear to Mr. Wright that they had been "monitoring" his phones and storing portions of his
conversations. See Lawrence Wright, The Spymaster: Can Mike McConnell Fix America's Intelli-
gence Community?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2008/01/21/080121fa fact_wright?currentPage=all.
121. ACLU Petition, supra note 92, at 44. FISA does contain a provision which prohibits
the probable cause finding that a United States person is an agent of a foreign power from
resting "solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [Flirst [Almendment to the Con-
stitttion of the United States" but it is unclear how much work this provision does towards
preventing the pretextual use of FISA given the minimal judicial scrutiny afforded defen-
dants under 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (5) (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 20-26.
122. United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972)
("History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-however benevolent and
benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies."); see
also DanielJ. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 491-99 (2006) (discussing
negative effects of surveillance); Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 635--36 (warning that allowing the
executive branch to make its own determinations regarding warrantless surveillance "invites
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opponents documented in the Church Committee reports, which
inspired FISA's enactment, provide historical support for this ar-
gument.1
23
After 9/11, the need to preemptively detect terrorist plots and
coordinate all of the resources of the federal government may have
warranted the shift to the significant purpose test and, indeed, ac-
cording to the government this shift has already paid dividends in
preventing several terrorist attacks.1 24 At the same time, electronic
surveillance technology has advanced at an astounding rate and is
now more intrusive then ever before. For example, the govern-
ment can store and search massive amounts of emails, follow a
suspect's web-browsing history, 125 and track a suspect's movement
via his cell phone.126 In addition, the resources directed at counter-
abuse, and public knowledge that such abuse is possible can exert a deathly pall over vigor-
ous First Amendment debate on issues of foreign policy").
123. See, e.g., the concerns regarding the enactment of the Patriot Act expressed by the
former Clinton White House Chief of Staff, John Podesta, USA PATRIOT Act: The Good, the
Bad, and the Sunset, 29 Hum. RTS. MAG. 3, 7 (2002) ("We should not forget what gave rise to
the original opposition-many aspects of the [Patriot Act] increase the opportunity for law
enforcement and the intelligence community to return to an era where they monitored and
sometimes harassed individuals who were merely exercising their First Amendment rights.
Nothing that occurred on September 11 mandates that we return to such an era.").
124. See Banks, The Death of FISA, supra note 40, at 1299-1300 (according to Banks,
"[t]he Justice Department has proudly showcased what it views as the tremendous benefits
from the Patriot Act's information sharing provisions and the lowering of the wall. One
example involved the Department's investigations of suspected al Qaeda cell members in
Lackawanna, New York, the 'Lackawanna Six.' The investigation began in the summer of
2001 based on an anonymous tip delivered to the FBI that local Yemeni-Americans might be
involved in drug crime and terrorist activities. Initially, the FBI 'concluded that existing law
required the creation of two separate investigations in order to retain the option of using
FISA.' According to the Department, the Patriot Act made clear that information sharing
between the two teams was allowed, which in turn let the criminal side know that an al
Qaeda agent was involved, leading to early criminal charges against the six.") (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT ACT AT WORK 3 (2004),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/patriot704.pdf)). But see Banks, Secret Sur-
veillance, supra note 9, at 1188 (questioning the government's assertions that the federal
prosecution of a Florida professor and seven others for financing suicide bombings in Israel
was only made possible by the expanded powers given to the Department of Justice after
9/11).
125. For example, Carnivore (later incarnations of which have been known as DCS-
1000) is a "packet sniffer," an Internet wiretap that reads traffic while it is in transit in packet
form. See, e.g., Christian D. H. Schultz, Note, Unrestricted Federal Agent: "Carnivore" and the Need
to Revise the Pen Register Statute, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1223-30 (2001) (providing an
overview of the Carnivore system and its capabilities); John Schwartz, Privacy Debate Focuses on
EB.!. Use of an Internet Wiretap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at A14 ("When Carnivore sits down
to eat, it tastes everything .... Once installed at the offices of an Internet service provider, it
works by monitoring all of the data that flows by it.").
126. The government is able to triangulate a suspect's location on the basis of "cell site"
information (signals sent from a person's cell phone, even when not in use, to nearby cell
towers). See Stephanie Lockwood, Recent Development, Who Knows Where You've Been ? Privacy
Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307,
308-16 (2004) (discussing the use of GPS positioning and signal triangulation to track a
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ing terrorism have increased massively since September 11th and
their focus has shifted toward intervening before an attack is
committed.127 The Patriot Act now authorizes "sneak-and-peak
searches, roving wiretaps which follow a suspect as he changes
phones, and access to "any tangible record" related to the target.1
This expansion of executive power must be restrained by some
method which protects individual rights while allowing the various
branches of the government to share information and coordinate
their efforts to prevent terrorist attacks.
fV. THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED TEST
This Note proposes that information gathered pursuant to a
FISA warrant be admitted only in those criminal cases involving
terrorism, espionage, or sabotage; or, in those cases where the
charges are "inextricably intertwined" with a foreign intelligence
crime.130 Evidence gathered pursuant to a FISA warrant would be
suspect's movements); Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location
Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 381, 384-94 (2003) (discussing
recent advancements in cellular telephone location tracking technology and analyzing pro-
posed legal restrictions on the technology). Compare In re Application of the United States
For An Order For Disclosure of Telecommunication Records And Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439-40, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (al-
lowing the government to obtain cell-site information on a certification of less than
probable cause), with In reApplication of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the
Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Sub-
scriber Information and/or Cell Site Information, 396 E Supp. 2d 294, 305-10, 321-24
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to authorize the acquisition of cell-site information on a showing
of less than probable cause).
127. The Attorney General has described the Department of Justice as adding a new
"paradigm of prevention" to that of prosecution. Banks, Secret Surveillance, supra note 9, at
1153 (citing Adam Liptak, Under Ashcrofl, Judicial Power Flows Back to Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2003, at wk5).
128. "Sneak-and-peek" searches were authorized in the Second Circuit prior to the Pa-
triot Act. See United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a "covert entry" warrant and stating that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment does not deal with notice of any kind"); United States v. Villegas, 899
F.2d 1324, 1337-38 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990) (authorizing a covert
entry search and requiring that notice of the search be given to the defendant "within a
reasonable time after the covert entry" but accepting a delay of two months); United States
v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986), modified, 856 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Kevin
Corr, Sneaky but Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peek Search Warrants, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 1103,
1105 (1995); Paul V. Kono%ulov, Note, On a Quest for Reason: A New Look at Surreptitious Search
Warrants, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 435, 443 (1997).
129. Smith, supra note 16, at 416-23.
130. This Note argues that Congress should statutorily create a means of enforcing the
FISCR's reasoning that FISA can only be used to investigate those crimes "inextricably inter-
twined" with a national security interest. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2002); see also Matthew R. Hall, Constitutional Regulation of National Security Investigation:
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
inadmissible in a prosecution for an "ordinary crime" with an in-
sufficient nexus to national security. This proposed restriction on
the use of evidence of unrelated crimes is not entirely without
precedent. Several states restrict the use of plain view evidence in-
advertently discovered pursuant to a Title III warrant' and
language in the FISCR's most recent decision indicates that the
court would support such a restriction. The court stated that FISA
"cannot be used as a device to investigate wholly unrelated ordi-
nary crimes" and dismissed the government's assertion that
prosecution of non-terrorist related crimes would be consistent
with the government's national security interest because it would
incapacitate the agent of a foreign power.132 The FISCR also would
allow the admission of FISA evidence in a prosecution for a crime
with a link to a foreign intelligence crime:
That is not to deny that ordinary crimes might be inextricably
intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes. For example, if a
group of international terrorists were to engage in bank rob-
beries in order to finance the manufacture of a bomb,
evidence of the bank robbery should be treated just as evi-
dence of the terrorist act itself.
33
The FISCR, however, fails to further define which crimes would
be "inextricably intertwined" with foreign intelligence crimes and
it provides no mechanism for limiting the use of FISA material in
non-foreign intelligence prosecutions. Indeed, no court before or
after this decision has found FISA material to be inadmissible in
the prosecution of an unrelated ordinary crime.134 This Note seeks
to flush out the contours of this restriction on the use of FISA ma-
terials and proposes a statutorily created means of enforcing the
"inextricably intertwined" restriction analogous to FRE 104(a).
Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 61, 103-09 (2006) (propos-
ing that courts interpret the minimization requirement of the Fourth Amendment as
limiting the use of FISA evidence to foreign intelligence prosecutions).
131. See infra notes 196-202.
132. In reSealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736.
133. Id.
134. Cf supra note 95 (listing all of those cases in which a court admitted FISA surveil-
lance evidence in a non-foreign intelligence related prosecution); supra note 71 (listing
many of the cases in which the court found the primary purpose of the surveillance to be
the collection of foreign intelligence information).
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A. The Easy Cases: Foreign Intelligence Crimes
Under an "inextricably intertwined" test, FISA evidence should
clearly be admissible in the prosecution of foreign intelligence
crimes including terrorism, espionage, and sabotage. In cases in-
volving terrorism, FISA evidence would be admissible in
prosecutions for hostage taking,13 aircraft piracy,13 possession or
sale of an explosive or incendiary rocket or missile system designed
to take down an airplane,1 3 7 bombing a public or government
space, 8 receiving military training from a terrorist organization, 9
possession or sale of biological weapons, chemical weapons, nu-1 • 140
clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Espionage1 4' and sabotage 42 crimes are also, in most cases, easily
identifiable. The difficulty with the test, however, exists in distin-
guishing between ordinary prosecutions in which FISA evidence
should not be admissible and those prosecutions in which FISA
evidence should be admissible because the "ordinary crime" is ac-
tually "inextricably intertwined" with a foreign intelligence crime.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006).
136. 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2000); see also id. § 46505 (criminalizing the carrying of a
weapon or explosive on an aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(4) (2006) (criminalizing the destruc-
tion of aircrafts).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 23 3 2g (2006); see also id. § 844(d) (criminalizing transportation or re-
ceipt of explosives with the knowledge or intent that it be used to kill, injure, or intimidate).
138. Id.§2332(f).
139. Id. § 2339(d).
140. Id. §§ 2332(a) (criminalizing the use of weapons of mass destruction), 175 (crimi-
nalizing possession of biological weapons), 229 (making it illegal to use, produce, possess, or
transfer a chemical weapon), 831 (criminalizing the possession of nuclear weapons), 832
(making it illegal to provide material support to a nuclear weapons program or other weap-
ons of mass destruction program of a foreign terrorist power), 2332 (criminalizing
possession of radiological dispersal devices).
141. See, e.g., id. §§ 792 (prohibiting the harboring or concealing of a person engaging
in espionage), 793 (criminalizing the gathering, transmitting, copying or losing of defense
information), 794 (criminalizing the gathering or delivering of defense information to aid
foreign government), 795 (making it illegal to photograph or sketch defense installations),
796 (criminalizing the use of aircraft for photographing defense installations), 798 (prohib-
iting the disclosure of classified information); see also id. §§ 951 (criminal prohibition against
acting as the agent of a foreign government), 953 (outlawing private correspondence with
foreign governments), 954 (criminalizing the making of false statements intended to influ-
ence a foreign government to the injury of the United States), 957 (criminalizing the
possession of property in aid of a foreign government).
142. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2156 (2006) (penalizing the sabotage or destruction of na-
tional defense facilities or materials); 42 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000) (penalizing the knowing
sabotage of nuclear facilities).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 42:1
B. Unrelated Cases in which the FISA Evidence Would be Excluded
A review of those cases in which courts have admitted FISA evi-
dence of crimes should shed some light on the execution of this
test. Of the sixty cases surveyed for this Note, a large majority
would be unaffected by this proposed restriction. Many of the cases
in which FISA materials have been introduced into evidence in-
volve straightforward terrorism cases 143 or garden-variety espionage
cases. 4 4 Other cases, however, involve the admission of FISA mate-
rial in prosecutions for ordinary crimes that are only loosely
connected or completely unrelated to a foreign intelligence crime.
For example, in United States v. Isa, the government obtained a FISA
warrant for surveillance of Zein Hassan Isa, a native-born Palestin-
ian, who the FBI suspected of ties to the Palestinian Liberation
143. FISA evidence was admitted in the following terrorism prosecutions: United States
v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (convicting defendants, members of an Ar-
menian terrorist organization, of conspiracy to bomb the Turkish Constlate in Philadelphia,
transportation of explosive materials, and possession of an unregistered firearm after dyna-
mite was discovered in their checked luggage); United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR-
COOKE/BROWN, 2007 WL 1068127, at *2-4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2007) (defendants were
charged with conspiracy to commit murder, maim, and kidnap people both in the U.S. and
overseas); United States v. Jayyousi, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE/BROWN, 2007 WL 851278
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2007) (trial of Hassoun's co-conspirator); United States v. Abu Ali, No. 05-
053, 2006 WL 4483162 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2006) (defendant was convicted of providing ma-
terial support to al-Qaeda, conspiracy to assassinate the President, conspiracy to commit
aircraft piracy, and conspiracy to destroy aircraft); United States v. Bin Laden, No. S7R
98CR1023KTD, 2005 WL 287404 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (defendants were convicted of
conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals and to destroy U.S. buildings stemming from the 1998
synchronized attacks on the United States Embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and Nai-
robi, Kenya); United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (defendants
were charged with "participating in a seditious conspiracy to conduct a war of urban terror-
ism against the United States"); United States v. Hovsepian, No. CR 82-917, 1985 WL 5970,
at *3 (C.D. Cal.Jan. 15, 1985), aff'd, United States v. Berberian, 851 E2d 236 (9th Cir. 1988)
(defendant was convicted of conspiracy to bomb and aiding and abetting transportation of
explosive material in connection with an attempt to blow up the Turkish Consulate in Phila-
delphia).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1029-32 (9th Cir. 1993) (FISA mate-
rial admitted in prosecution for selling classified information to the KGB); United States v.
Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1069-71, 1074-76 (4th Cir. 1987) (FISA surveillance used to catch an
NSA defector to the Soviets. The defector was subsequently charged with espionage and
unauthorized disclosure of classified information concerning communications intelligence);
United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 788-92 (9th Cir. 1987) (FISA evidence was admit-
ted in prosecution of defendant for selling classified defense information to the Soviets);
United States v. Ott, 637 F. Supp. 62, 63-67 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.
1987) (serviceman unlawfully contacted representatives of foreign government to offer to
sell them classified information); United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Va.
1997) (FISA materials admitted in espionage prosecution); United States v. Horton, 17 MJ.
1131, 1132-34 (N-M Ct. Rev. 1984) (defendant was convicted in Navy Court of failing to
report contacts with citizens of a communist controlled country and soliciting sale of classi-
fied information).
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Organization. 4 5 During the FBI's surveillance of Isa, they overheard
Isa and his wife, Maria Matias Isa, murder their sixteen-year-old
daughter. Prosecutors later introduced tapes of the murder, as well
as conversations surrounding it, during the trial of Isa and his wife
for first degree murder.146 Despite the tragic factual circumstances of
this case, the actual tapes of the murder should have been ex-
cluded because the murder was completely unrelated to foreign
intelligence or national security. The government would still be
free to use the fruits of this surveillance to prosecute Isa and his
wife for murder on the basis of other independently obtained evi-
dence. 4 1 In U.S. v. Brown, the government obtained a FISA warrant
to surveil several suspected agents of the Libyan government."'
Pursuant to this warrant, the government wiretapped the phone of
the Manara Travel Agency,4 9 and inadvertently stumbled upon a
conspiracy to commit credit card fraud using stolen calling card
access numbers involving people who were not the targets of the
surveillance. This case represents a fairly common scenario in
which the government discovers criminal activity through the inad-
vertent interception of the communications of someone other
than the "foreign agent" targeted by the FISA wiretap."15 Under the
"inextricably intertwined" test proposed in this Note, the FISA evi-
dence would be excluded at a later trial because the credit card
fraud is unrelated to a foreign intelligence crime. '5'
145. United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991).
146. Id. at 1302.
147. Both the "inevitable discovery rule" and the "independent source" doctrine would
still, of course, apply and evidence of a non-foreign intelligence crime could still be
admitted under either of those methods of dissipating the taint. The inevitable discovery
rule allows the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence that would have inevitably
been discovered through lawful means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984); see also
Martin J. McMahon, What Circumstances Fall within "Inevitable Discovey" Exception to Rule Pre-
cluding Admission, in Criminal Case, of Evidence Obtained in Violation of Federal Constitution, 81
A.L.R. FED. 331 (1987). The "independent source" doctrine permits the introduction of
evidence initially discovered during, or as consequence of, an unlawful search, but later
rediscovered independently through lawful means untainted by the initial illegality. See, e.g.,
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537-39 (1988) (describing the origin and contours of
the independent source doctrine). In addition, there is a powerful argument that these
rules should be applied liberally in the context of FISA evidence because the police have not
necessarily acted illegally.
148. 908 F.2d 968 (Table), Nos. 89-5404 to 89-5407, 1990 WIL 101946, at *1 (4th Cir.
June 21, 1990).
149. Id.
150. See infra note 183.
151. Any exculpatory evidence generated through the FISA surveillance should still
clearly be admissible in a prosecution of a non-foreign intelligence crime. Although, the
prosecution is not required to comb through the FISA surveillance for exculpatory evi-
dence. See supra note 35.
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C. Borderline Cases: Crimes Committed to Provide
Material Support to a FFO
The situation posing the greatest difficulty for the "inextricably
intertwined" test is one in which the target of FISA surveillance
commits an ordinary crime allegedly to raise money or provide
"material support" to a foreign terrorist organization ("FFO"). 52
There are powerful policy arguments in favor of admitting FISA
material in these cases if the government can establish a sufficient
nexus to terrorism or espionage. On the other hand, the restric-
tion becomes meaningless if the government can circumvent it
simply by alleging a link to terrorist activities. The government
should be required to prove some connection with a foreign intel-
ligence crime or activity in order to reap the benefits of FISA
surveillance.
This Note proposes a two-step process in prosecutions for ordi-
nary crimes allegedly linked to a foreign intelligence crime. First,
the government must charge the defendant with a foreign intelli-
gence crime or with material support of a terrorist organization.
An indictment requires the government to demonstrate probable
cause supporting the charge that the defendant committed either
a foreign intelligence crime or an ordinary crime in order to sup-
port a terrorist organization. Second, the judge will review the
government's proof in camera and, if the judge finds by a prepon-
derance of the evidence1 53 that the ordinary crime is "inextricably
intertwined" with the foreign intelligence crime, then the FISA
evidence should be admitted in the criminal trial.'
54
The large majority of "material support" cases, involving the di-
rect sale of arms to a terrorist group 55 or the laundering of money
152. See supra note 7.
153. A clear and convincing standard of proof might also be appropriate.
154. Under Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and (b), a procedure already exists for
determining preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence. FED. R. EVID.
104(a)-(b). For example, a trial judge must find by a preponderance of evidence that the
statement of a co-conspirator was (1) made during the course and (2) in furtherance of the
conspiracy to justify its introduction into evidence against the defendant. FED. R. EVID.
104(b). In making its determination regarding the admissibility of this evidence, the court is
not bound by the rules of evidence. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
155. FISA evidence was admitted in the following cases involving the smuggling of
weapons or arms to a terrorist organization: United States v. McKinley, 995 F.2d 1020, 1022-
24 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (admitting FISA evidence in prosecution of defendant for sale of stinger
missiles and other explosives to the IRA and conspiracy to blow up a British airliner); United
States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1460-64 (11th Cir. 1987) (admitting FISA evidence against a
defendant charged with selling weapons to his co-defendant, who is a member of Omega-7,
a militant anti-Castro group); United States v. Megahey, 553 E. Supp. 1180, 1182 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd, United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984) (defendants were convicted,
in part from FISA evidence, of unlicensed exportation of items on the United States Muni-
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to a terrorist group,5 6 will easily satisfy the "inextricably inter-
twined" test. Similarly, most espionage prosecutions involve a
defendant selling state secrets, military technology, or classified
materials directly to a foreign agent. As a result, the government
should have no trouble meeting the standard of proof necessary to
admit the FISA material .
The government has, however, utilized FISA evidence in several
"ordinary" prosecutions without demonstrating probable cause to
believe that the defendant is linked to a terrorist organization. In
tions List, various firearm offenses and transportation of explosives in interstate commerce
knowing that the explosives would be used to kill, injure, or intimidate individuals); United
States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (admitting FISA evidence in a
prosecution for smuggling arms and equipment to the Provisional Irish Republican Army).
156. FISA evidence was admitted in the following cases involving charges of providing
material support to a terrorist organization: United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325-
26 (4th Cir. 2004) (defendant was convicted, pursuant to FISA evidence, of providing mate-
rial support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, along with possibly related
crimes, including money laundering, credit card fraud, and transportation of contraband
cigarettes); United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007
WL 2011319, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 11, 2007) (prosecution for donations to various organi-
zations affiliated or controlled by Hamas, an FTO); United States v. Warsame, No. 04-29
(JRT), 2007 WL 748281, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2007) (defendant was convicted of provid-
ing material support and resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization); United States v.
Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1051-52 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (FISA evidence admitted in prosecu-
tion of defendant for providing material support to al-Qaeda and receiving military training
in preparation for violentJihad in Ogaden, Ethiopia); United States v. Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d
707, 709-11 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (defendant was charged with providing technical equipment
to Hezbollah including two Boeing global positioning satellite modules, night vision gog-
gles, and a thermal imaging camera); United States v. Elashi, 440 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541-43
(N.D. Tex. 2006) (admitting FISA evidence in prosecution of defendants for laundering
money in order to provide material support to Hamas, an F0); United States v. A1-Arian,
267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1259-60 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (members of the University of South Florida
faculty charged with providing material support in the form of money to the Palestinian
Islamicjihad Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ) and succor to the families of suicide bombers).
157. The following cases, which involve the admission of FISA evidence in espionage
prosecutions, would probably also proceed tnaffected by the implementation of the "inex-
tricably intertwined" test: United States v. Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 2007)
(defendants found guilty of violating export-control laws by providing militanly useful
technology to foreign cotntry without required license); United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d
1121, 1126-27 (11th Cir. 2006) (admitting FISA evidence in prosecution of defendants for
serving as agents of the Cuban government and transmitting secret intelligence information
to the Cuban government); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 547-52 (4th Cir.
2000) (husband and wife were convicted of conspiracy to transmit information relating to
the national defense); United States v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1989) (admit-
ting evidence in prosecution of defendant for selling military technology to the South
African government in violation of the Anti-Apartheid Act); United States v. Thomas, No. 06
CR. 365(DLC), 2006 WL 2283772, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006) (defendant was convicted
for selling telecommunications equipment to the Iraqi government through China due in
part to the admission of FISA evidence); United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 541-42
(E.D. Va. 2006) (admitting FISA evidence in prosecution for conspiring to communicate
national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it); United States v. Dumeisi,
No. CivA 06C4165, 2006 WL 2990436, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2006) (Defendant Khaled
Abded-Latif Dumeisi was convicted of acting as an agent of Iraq).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
United States v. Jamal, for example, the government indicted Jamal
and several others entangled in a large fencing operation which
involved stealing or fraudulently obtaining baby formula and
transporting it across state lines to make a large profit.' 5s The de-
fendants made over eleven million dollars, which they allegedly
funneled to sources in Syria and Lebanon. 9 The government,
however, never offered any evidence connecting the defendants
with any terrorist group and for some reason did not charge the
defendants with material support of a terrorist organization.
1 6 0
Unless the government could muster some proof of a connection
to a foreign intelligence crime, under the test proposed herein, the
FISA materials would be inadmissible against the defendants. Simi-
larly, in United States v. Mubayyid, the defendants were prosecuted
for making false statements on their tax returns and fraudulently
obtaining a charitable exemption for their organization, Care In-
ternational ("Care").161 Care allegedly solicited funds for, and
issued publications promoting, Islamic holy war, or "jihad."1 6 2 Based
on the limited opinion released to the public, the government
provided no evidence of the connection between Mubayyid and
any terrorist organization and opted not to charge the defendants
with material support of any terrorist organization. 163 Under the
proposed test, the government, in these two cases, might not be
able to meet the standard of proof necessary for the admission of
the FISA evidence because it apparently lacked sufficient evidence
to convict the defendants of providing material support to a terror-
ist organization.
Since September 11th, the government has increasingly used
perjury prosecutions and deportation proceedings as a way to in-
158. United States v. Jamal (Jamal I), 285 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1222-24 (D. Ariz. 2003),
aff'd, United States v. Daly, Nos. 05-10718, 05-10719, 05-10728, 05-10729, 243 F. App'x 302,
306 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Joseph A. Reaves, Fourteen Arrested in Alleged Money-Laundering
Operation in Southern Florida, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 2003, at Al, available at
http://www.policeone.com/investigations/articles/66262/.
159. JamalI, 285 E Supp. 2d at 1222.
160. The defendants were charged with "eight (8) felonies: Conspiracy to Commit In-
terstate Transportation of Stolen Property (Count 1); Interstate Transportation of Stolen
Property (Counts 2, 3 and 4); False Statements (Counts 5, 6 and 7); and Conspiracy to
Commit Money Laundering." Jamal I, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 1222; see Reaves, supra note 158, at
Al ("Authorities, however, avoided linking any of those arrested with terrorist activities. '"Ae
want to make sure that the individuals who are charged in this case defend themselves on
the counts they are charged with and not on speculation or hypotheticals,' said U.S. Attor-
ney Paul K. Charlton, who announced the crackdown.").
161. United States v. Mubayyid, No. 05-40026-FDS, 2007 WL 3287393, at *1 (D. Mass.
Nov. 5, 2007).
162. Id.
163. Id. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States,
false statements, and obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service.
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capacitate suspected terrorists.'64 If the government lacks sufficient
evidence in these cases to bring a material support charge then,
under the "inextricably intertwined" test, the government would be
precluded from admitting FISA evidence to prove the falsity of a
defendant's claim that he is not a member or supporter of a terrorist
organization. For example, in U.S. v. Benevolence Intern Foundation,
Inc., the government presented FISA evidence to charge the CEO of
the Benevolence International Foundation ("BIF") with perjury for
claiming: "BIF has never provided aid or support to people or or-
ganizations known to be engaged in violence, terrorist activities, or
military operations of any nature.16' Yet, for some reason, the gov-
ernment never charged BIF or its CEO with providing material
support to an ITO even after the perjury indictment was subse-
quently dismissed. If this decision not to proceed with a material
support prosecution was due to a lack of evidence, then under the
inextricably intertwined test this FISA evidence would be inadmis-
sible in the perjury prosecution.
1 6
164. According to an ICE spokesman, Dean Boyd, from 2003-2005, officials filed
immigration charges against more than 500 people who have come under scrutiny in
national security investigations. Many of these 500 people were ultimately found to have
no terrorism ties. "Homeland Security officials say immigration laws can provide a quick,
easy way to detain people who could be planning attacks. Authorities have also used rou-
tine charges such as overstaying a visa to deport suspected supporters of terrorist groups."
Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Fool, WASH. PosT, June 13, 2005, at
A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conttnt/article/2005/06/12/
AR2005061201441.html; see also Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2: Combating
Terrorism Through Immigration Policies, Oct. 29, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/10/20011030-2.html (establishing the "Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force" to locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any aliens associated with terrorist
organizations who are already present in the United States).
165. No. 02 CR 414, 2002 WL 31050156, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2002); see also United
States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 620-22 (6th Cir. 2005) (admitting FISA evidence in prosecu-
tion for unlawfully obtaining citizenship by making false statements denying involvement
with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad); In re GrandJury Proceedings of Special April 2002 Grand
Jury, 347 F.3d 197, 204-06 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding witness in contempt for refusing to an-
swer grand jury questions and rejecting witnesses' argument that he should not be required
to answer questions based upon an allegedly unconstitutional FISA wiretap); In re Grand
Jury Proceeding, Grand Jury No. 87-4 Empaneled, 856 F.2d 685, 687-90 (4th Cir. 1988)
(using FISA material to formulate questions in a grand jury proceeding).
166. One potential complication arises in prosecutions in which the underlying "mate-
rial support" or foreign intelligence counts are dismissed after the FISA evidence has been
introduced in the trial of the "inextricably intertwined" non-foreign intelligence crime. If
the grand jury found probable cause for the material support charge and the judge found a
sufficient nexus between the material support crime and the "ordinary crime" then the
evidence should still be admissible in these types of situations and a dismissal (or failure to
convict) of the other counts should not constitute reversible error. See, e.g., United States v.
Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2006) (the defendant was prosecuted for making
false statements to a grand jury regarding a trip that he took to Pakistan in 1999 during
which the government alleges that he received military training from the Taliban. The de-
fendant was initially charged with "willfully supplying and attempting to supply services" to a
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Finally, deportation proceedings present a rare exception to the
rule, proposed herein, that the government should not be allowed
to admit FISA evidence when it lacks sufficient evidence to prove a
link to a foreign intelligence crime. Any type of evidence, includ-
ing hearsay, 16 7 illegally seized evidence,ss and character evidence, is
admissible in a deportation proceeding and a failure to demonstrate
"good character" can disqualify an applicant for citizenship. 169 In
addition, given that the individual interest at stake in an immigra-
tion proceeding is less than that at stake in a criminal proceeding,
there is a powerful policy argument that FISA evidence should be
admissible.
V. ARGUMENTS FOR THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED TEST
The inextricably intertwined test reestablishes the proper bal-
ance between individual rights and the state interest in national
foreign terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba ("LET"), in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705
(2000). However, LET had not yet been designated a FTO at the time and consequently, the
charges were dismissed. As a result, this presents another situation in which under the "inex-
tricably intertwined" test, the FISA material should be excluded); see also United States v.
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 356-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing the counts related to "provid-
ing material support" to a terrorist organization as unconstitutionally vague. Under the
"inextricably intertwined test" proposed herein, if these counts were dismissed then it would
probably necessitate the exclusion of the FISA evidence in the underlying criminal prosecu-
tion); United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR 395, 2003 WL 22137012, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,
2003).
167. See Ernest H. Schopler, Hearsay Evidence in Proceedings before Federal Administrative
Agencies, 6 A.L.R. FED. 76 § 12[b] (2007) ("Notwithstanding a decision of the United States
Supreme Court reaching a contrary result under the circumstances presented, the lower
federal courts seem to agree that in administrative deportation proceedings, evidence
should not be excluded merely because of its nature as hearsay.").
168. The case law is divided on this point with some circuits admitting illegally seized
evidence in deportation proceedings and others only admitting the fruits of an illegal
search. Daniel E. Feld, Admissibility, in Deportation Hearing, of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search
and Seizure, 44 A.L.R. FED. 933 (2007).
169. The Nationality Act of 1940 provides: "[n]o person ... shall be naturalized unless
such petitioner,... during all the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is
a person of good moral character." 8 U.S.C. § 707(a) (3) (2006). Whether a particular appli-
cant evinces good moral character is a question of fact. See, e.g., Daddona v. United States,
170 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1948). The burden of proving good moral character is typically
placed on the applicant, with any doubts to be resolved against him or her. In re Kovacs, 476
F.2d 843, 845 (2d Cir. 1973); Nemetz v. I.N.S., 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981). Hearsay
regarding the applicant's general reputation in a community is also often deemed admissi-
ble. Petition of B., 154 F. Supp. 633, 634 (D. Md. 1957). See generally 3C ANI JuR 2D. ALIENS
§ 2312 (2007). Participation in, or support of, terrorist activities has been held to require
deportation of an alien and the Patriot Act, Pub L. 107-56, § 411, 345-50, expanded the
grounds for deportation to include "terrorist related" activities. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (2006); see also McAllister v. Attorney General of U.S., 444 E3d
178 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 667 (U.S. 2006) (deporting an alien on the
grounds that he had engaged in terrorist activities).
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security that was sacrificed in the Patriot Act. This test also ad-
dresses the central concerns identified by critics of the significant
purpose test and gives the judiciary an important role in checking
the executive's use of its surveillance powers. First, by preventing
the use of FISA materials in ordinary prosecutions that do not have
a link to foreign intelligence crimes, this test deters law enforce-
ment personnel from pretextually seeking a FISA warrant in a case
involving only ordinary criminal activity. A law enforcement agent
would have no reason to seek a FISA warrant unless he suspected
the target of engaging in a foreign intelligence crime. Second, the
inextricably intertwined test will, to a certain extent, decrease the
disproportionate enforcement of "ordinary laws" against Muslims,
Arab Americans, and other groups. These minority groups may still
be disproportionately targeted by FISA applications but at least
they will not be subjected to a lesser standard of Fourth Amend-
ment protection in non-foreign intelligence prosecutions. Third,
this restriction will deter the use of FISA warrants to gather evi-
dence to prosecute political opponents and persons who engage in
disfavored speech. Finally, by preventing the introduction of FISA
evidence at the trial of a person whose communications have been
incidentally intercepted by a FISA warrant, this test would elimi-
nate the unjust forfeiture of a person's Fourth Amendment
protections that results simply by associating with a FISA target or
using the same phone line or trunk line as a FISA target.
At the same time, a restriction on the use of FISA materials
avoids the difficulties involved in drawing a line based on the sub-
jective intent of the officers involved in the surveillance.7
Moreover, by refusing to resurrect the "primary purpose wall," the
"inextricably intertwined test" allows intelligence personnel to
communicate, cooperate, and share information without the fear
of jeopardizing a future prosecution. The amorphous nature of
terrorist plots and the difficulty of infiltrating a variety of discon-
nected terrorist cells necessitate the cooperation of different
intelligence branches. This test allows intelligence personnel to
keep tabs on suspected terrorists and other national security
threats without demonstrating probable cause, thereby enabling
the marshaling of the government's resources toward preventing
another catastrophic attack.
170. Indeed, the difficulty of determining the subjective intent of officers involved in a
search has led courts to shy away from this criterion in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Whren
v United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that the constitutional reasonableness of
a traffic stop does not depend on the motivations of the individual officers involved); see also
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (eliminating the subjective requirement, in a plain
view context, that officers "inadvertently discover" evidence).
FALL 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Moreover, as the war on terrorism progresses it is important that
as a society we encourage our government to combat terrorism
within the confines of the legal system. The Bush administration
has employed a series of extra-legal methods including torture, the
detention of enemy combatants without habeas review, and the
implementation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP").I7' It
has justified these tactics by arguing that the legal system in its cur-
rent form does not provide effective tools for fighting terrorism.
By enabling intelligence officers to cooperate with each other and
then bring foreign intelligence prosecutions, the inextricably inter-
twined test is superior to the primary purpose test because it brings
terrorists within the confines of the criminal justice system. By con-
trast, if the primary purpose test were resurrected and government
officials feared FISA evidence would be excluded, then intelligence
officials might indefinitely detain a suspect at a black site1 13 instead
of risking an unsuccessful prosecution. In a similar vein, David Kris
has argued that the fall of the primary purpose wall will actually
171. Evidence exists that various government agencies continue to engage in extra-legal
surveillance and data-mining without any oversight. See Bradley Olson, Domestic Spying Quietly
Goes On, BALTIMORE SUN,JUl. 7,2008, at A.1.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 205-06; see also Press Release, Alberto R. Gonza-
les, Attorney Gen., and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat'l Intelligence
(Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/
20051219-1.html (Gen. Michael Hayden, discussing how the "agility" of the TSA allowed the
NSA to track terrorist cells, stated, "I can say unequivocally, all right, that we have got
information through this program that would not otherwise have been available [under
FISA]."); James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/
16program.html (The eavesdropping program grew out of concerns after the Sept. 11 at-
tacks that the nation's intelligence agencies were not poised to deal effectively with the new
threat of Al Qaeda and that they were handcuffed by legal and bureaucratic restrictions
better suited to peacetime than war, according to officials.); John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen.,
Testimony Before the House Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 24, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm ("Law enforcement
tools created decades ago were crafted for rotary telephone-not email, the Internet, mo-
bile communications, and voice mail. Every day that passes with outdated statutes and the
old rules of engagement-each day that so passes is a day that terrorists have a competitive
advantage."). See generally Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at
106, available at http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050214fa_fact6 (discussing the
"extraordinary rendition" program and the Bush administration's justifications for the pro-
gram).
173. In military terminology, a black site is a location at which a black project (a secret
project unacknowledged by the U.S. government) is conducted. In the context of the war on
terror, the term black site has come to refer to secret CIA prisons outside of the United
States used to hold enemy combatants with little or no political oversight. Various commen-
tators have hypothesized that these prisons are situated in countries that tolerate torture. See
Dafna Linzer & Julie Tate, New Light Shed on CIA's Black Sites, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007,
at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/27/
AR2007022702214_pf.html; Bush Admits CIA Black Sites, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Sept. 5, 2006,
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/0,1518,435736,OO.html.
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increase the protection of civil liberties under FISA by increasing
the involvement of Department of Justice ("DOJ") lawyers in intel-
ligence investigations.
17 4
Finally, the constitutional arguments in favor of a foreign intelli-
gence exception to the Fourth Amendment, namely the "special
need" of the government to protect national security and the
President's Article II power,175 recede into the background in the
context of non-foreign intelligence prosecutions.1 76 Therefore, by
confining the use of FISA material to foreign intelligence prosecu-
tions, this test solidifies the shaky constitutional ground on which
FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, currently rests.'
7
VI. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE INEXTRICABLY
INTERTWINED TEST
This Part aims to dispel the most common criticism of the re-
striction proposed by this Note-that the inextricably intertwined
1781test violates the plain view doctrine. V While it is undoubtedly true
that this test would result in the exclusion of "plain view" evidence
of some non-foreign intelligence crimes, the policy rationale un-
derlying the plain view doctrine is inapplicable to electronic
communications gathered under FISA.
Electronic surveillance invades a much wider realm of privacy
rights than a normal physical search; electronic surveillance ex-
poses every email, fax, text message, phone conversation, and
174. David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wa, 17 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 487, 523-
24 (2006) (according to Kris, the FISA wall kept DOJ lawyers in the field completely sepa-
rated from intelligence investigations whereas after the In re Sealed Case decision, prosecutors
will "control and direct" intelligence investigations. Kris argues that the orientation of DOJ
lawyers toward preserving the option of criminal prosecution makes them especially sensi-
tive to preventing violations of individual rights that could affect the subsequent criminal
case).
175. See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 402-12 (presenting the aforementioned arguments
in favor of FISA's constitutionality).
176. See United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) (justifying the pri-
mary purpose test by arguing that "once surveillance becomes primarily a criminal
investigation... individual privacy interests come to the fore and government foreign policy
concerns recede").
177. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1036-42 (D. Or. 2007) (holding
that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as amended by the Patriot Act is unconstitu-
tional).
178. SeegeneraUy United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (8th Cir. 1991) ("If Federal
agents monitoring a foreign intelligence surveillance authorized under this chapter were to
overhear information relating to a violation of State criminal law, such as homicide, the
agents could hardly be expected to conceal such information from the appropriate local
officials.").
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movement that a target makes.'79 Indeed, the nature of electronic
communications makes it impossible to determine the destination
or source of an email sent along a network's trunk line without de-
coding and reading the entire email.'80 This aspect of email
communications makes it impossible to "minimize"'' the acquisi-
tion and dissemination of (1) personal emails unrelated to the
target's criminal activity and (2) emails of other people using the
same trunk line. 2 The "incidental" interception of the communi-
cations of anyone using the same trunk line as a suspect creates a
potentially gigantic hole in Fourth Amendment protections by al-
lowing the government to wiretap a large group of people without
ever demonstrating probable cause regarding those people. 1 3 In
many cases, a warrant issued for one person would necessitate the
review of a large number of emails involving the personal commu-
nications of other unrelated people. 1 4 Therefore, electronic
179. See supra notes 125-26.
180. See Larry Downes, Electronic Communications and the Plain View Exception: More "Bad
Physics, "7 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 239, 265 (1994) [hereinafter Downes] ("For digital communi-
cations, however, it is impossible to determine the nature of the communication using the
traditional minimization technique, because several layers of hardware and software must be
applied to convert the intercepted signal, first to its digital format, then to a recognizable
communications protocol, and finally to a format understandable to human beings. The
sender, receiver, and subject of a message are unknown until the last step. It is impossible to
discard a digital communication that is unrelated to the subject offenses until after all of its
contents are revealed to the investigators."); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law
After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. RE,. 607, 611-22 (2003) (de-
scribing the pre-internet Fourth Amendment distinction between the address information
on the outside of the envelope and the content contained within the envelope as outdated
when applied to the internet because of the impossibility of disentangling the envelope
information, i.e., the IP address, from the content of the email).
181. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (declaring a New York statute un-
constitutional because it failed to prevent indiscriminate wiretapping). See, e.g., Bynum v.
United States, 423 U.S. 952, 952-53 (1975) (explaining that the minimization provision in
Title III which requires that every intercept be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of unrelated communications "constitutes the congressionally designed bul-
wark" designed to adhere to the constitutional guidelines announced in Berger).
182. The "truck line" is the line of communication between the telecommunications
carrier and a network of phones, computers, and fax machines.
183. Indeed, the incidental interception of an incriminating phone call has already led
to several convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1461 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cavanagh, 807
F.2d 787, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 79 (2d. Cir. 1984);
United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR. 395(JGK), 2003 WL 21698266, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Jul. 22,
2003); United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 252 (S.D.N.Y 1994); United States v. Bel-
field, 692 E2d 141, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This problem will only become worse with the
increased use of digital communications and the internet.
184. For example, many offices and businesses utilize private branch exchanges (PBXs)
to connect their faxes, telephones and internet to the outside telecommunications carrier.
In order to intercept the communications of one person within the office or business, the
government would have to place the wiretap on the trunk line and intercept all communica-
tions going to and from the office building. The government would then decode these
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communications not only invade the privacy rights of the individ-
ual to a greater degree than a normal search'8 5 but they also
infringe on the privacy rights of a greater number of innocent per-
sons.
At the same time, the limitations placed on the plain view doc-
trine in the context of physical searches do not protect individual
rights when applied to electronic surveillance. Police may constitu-
tionally seize evidence in plain view only when (1) the seizing
officer is lawfully in place to make the seizure and the "scope" of
the search is reasonable; (2) it is immediately apparent... to the
officer that the seized item constitutes evidence; and (3) the dis-
covery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent.8 7 As with the
primary purpose test, courts have largely eliminated the third re-
quirement due to the difficulty of determining the officer's
subjective intent.8 As a result, the "immediately apparent" re-
quirement and the scope limitation" 9 on the plain view doctrine
have gained increasing relevance as a means of preventing the po-
lice from engaging in pretextual searches.' 90
transmissions, retaining those involving criminal activity and discarding those unrelated to
criminal activity. See Downes, supra note 180, at 239, 264 (posing the example of a Title III
warrant issued for a broker suspected of insider trading at a large brokerage firm and stating
that "[tiapping the trunk line captures all communications, analog and digital, transmitted
to and from the office under investigation"); see also Kerr, supra note 180, at 650 (analogizing
the government's surveillance of internet communications to a police officer walking
through a crowd; surveilling a suspect necessitates scanning "all of the traffic flowing over
the network to locate, isolate, and collect the IP headers.").
185. United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934
(1972) (stating that "the search for property is a different and less traumatic invasion than is
the quest for private conversations").
186. "Immediately apparent" means that the police officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the item in plain view is incriminating in nature. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (stating that "the extension of the original justification
[for the search] is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.").
187. Id.
188. SeeHorton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1990).
189. If the warrant specifies a large object, then the police cannot search in places un-
able to contain an object of that size. See id. at 141-42 (upholding the admission of the guns
used to commit the robbery discovered in "plain view" while searching for the proceeds of
the robbery (rings)).
190. Id. at 139-40 (dismissing the "inadvertent discovery" requirement because society's
interest in "prevent[ing] the police from conducting general searches, or from converting
specific warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already
served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it 'particularly describ[es] the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,'" and that "[s]crupulous adherence
to these requirements serves the interests in limiting the area and duration of the search
that the inadvertence requirement inadequately protects").
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The realities of electronic surveillance are such that neither of
these limitations is particularly effective in this context. First, under
the plain view doctrine, police cannot look in places unlikely to
contain the objects specified in the warrant"9' or manipulate an ob-
ject in order to find evidence.1 9 2 In the context of electronic
communications, the criminal nature of the evidence is never
"immediately apparent" and digital signals sending emails, faxes,
and phone calls must be "manipulated" (translated from digital
code to English) in order to be understood. 93 Second, as discussed
above, the decoding process makes minimizing the acquisition of
unrelated digital signals almost impossible; a computer recording a
digital signal cannot stop listening when the conversation becomes
impertinent.
A recognition of these concerns led several courts194 and com-
mentators9 5 to question the applicability of the plain view doctrine
to the interception of electronic communications under Title III.
Indeed, in order to protect constitutional rights, Title III imposes
additional procedural prerequisites for the admissibility of elec-
tronically-intercepted plain view evidence. 196 Under § 2517(5) of
191. Id.
192. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 365, 377-79 (1993) (excluding the evidence
because its incriminating nature was not "immediately apparent"; the officer had to squeeze,
slide, and manipulate the small object before he realized that it was crack cocaine); Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987) (excluding stolen turntables discovered at the defendant's
house because the officer had to move the turntables to find their serial numbers and then
run those serial numbers through a police database and therefore the criminal nature of the
turntables was not immediately apparent).
193. See Downes, supra note 180, at 241 n.9 ("The modern approach, however, invaria-
bly includes converting the communication to a digital signal, which must be decoded by
sophisticated software to be 'understood' on the receiving end. Image and data are often
encrypted, and in any event are never sent in forms that are meaningful without interpreta-
tion by additional software-often proprietary to the receiver or the carrier. Introduction of
'wiretap' evidence may increasingly require expert witnesses to explain the government's
translation processes and technologies.").
194. SeeJohn D. LaDue, Electronic Surveillance and Conversations in Plain View: Admitting
Intercepted communications Relating to Crimes Not Specified in the surveillance Order, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 490, 491 n.13 (1990) [hereinafter LaDue] (citing United States v. Williams,
737 F2d 594, 605 (7th Cir. 1984) and United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 686 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1971)).
195. Compare Downes supra note 180, and Raymond R. Kepner, Subsequent Use of Electronic
Surveillance Interceptions and the Plain View Doctrine: Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Omni-
bus Crime Control Act, 9 U. MIcH.J.L. REF. 529, 540-53 (1976), with LaDue, supra note 194, at
526-33 (arguing that procedural safeguards to the use of plain view evidence obtained pur-
suant to a Title III wiretap should be removed). See also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a
Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531 (arguing that the plain view doctrine should not apply
in the context of searches of computer hard-drives).
196. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (2006), plain view evidence is only admissible if "a
judge of competent jurisdiction ... finds on subsequent application that the contents were
otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application
shall be made as soon as practicable" (emphasis added). The legislative history explains that
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Title III, evidence of other crimes, not listed in the application, is
admissible only if an amendment to the original application is ac-
cepted by a judge who finds: (1) the original order was properly
obtained; (2) the original order was not sought pretextually as a
"subterfuge search" for evidence of the unlisted crime; and (3) the
application for the amendment was made as soon as practical. 17
The second requirement appears intended to prevent police offi-
cers from using evidence that they did not "inadvertently discover,"
thereby deterring the pretextual use of § 2517(5). Moreover, thirty-
two state statutes impose additional restrictions on the use of plain
view evidence obtained pursuant to Title 111.198 In Nevada'99 and
Connecticut,200 for example, the surveillance evidence is inadmissi-
ble but the officers may use fruits of the illegal surveillance. In
comparison, California's statute bars the use of both unauthorized
intercepted communications concerning crimes not specified in
the original order and fruits derived from the unauthorized inter-
cept.20 ' Finally, several states limit the admission of plain view
evidence to prosecutions of certain enumerated felonies.02 Inter-
estingly, Title III and many state statutes have crafted an exception
to their procedural requirements for the admission of "plain view"
evidence in cases involving (1) an offense "similar to" the underly-
ing offense; or (2) an offense that is an "integral part" of the crime
specified in the underlying application.02 Title III and these state
this plain view evidence may only be admitted in a subsequent judicial proceeding upon a
showing that "the original order was lawfully obtained, that it sought in good faith and not
as a subterfuge search, and that the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted
during the course of a lawfully executed order." S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 100 (1968), as re-
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2180, 2189.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (2006).
198. LaDue, supra note 194, at 521 n.190.
199. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.465(4) (West 2008).
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41p(c), (d) (West 2008).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b) (West 2007).
202. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-15-102(16) (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§934.08(5) (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-64(c) (West 2000); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 803-45(e), (f) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.8(E) (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-67(E) (West 2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-600(r) (2008).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Campagnuolo, 556 F.2d 1209, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1977) (re-
laxing the authorization requirement because the offense for which the wiretap was
authorized and the offense for which the information was used were so similar that there
was no chance that the original wiretap was a "subterfuge" or a pretextual search); United
States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1470 (11th Cir. 1985) (admitting evidence in a RICO
prosecution, even though the Wiretap Authorization specified drug offenses, because the
drug offenses were an integral component of the RICO offense). Both cases express the view
that the surveillance evidence should be admissible because the connection between the
offense specified in the original order and the subsequent plain view offense is close enough
that it would be unreasonable to believe that the officers had engaged in a pretextual
search.
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statutes recognize the importance of erecting procedural barriers
to protect against the pretextual seizure of plain view evidence.
Preventing the pretextual use of FISA has become even more
critical with the increased importance of electronic communica-
tions and the increased invasiveness of surveillance technology.
TSP, for example, aims to data mine the electronic communica-
tions of all citizens 4 thereby transforming all communications into
admissible "plain view" evidence. If FISA evidence is not restricted
to foreign intelligence crimes, then there is no reason to believe
that evidence gathered under the TSP will be limited to foreign
intelligence prosecutions. Moreover, there is little reason to believe
that the Executive will be satisfied with the recent expansion of its
FISA surveillance power. Echoing the words of his predecessor,
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez called for increased executive
discretion: "[t] he operators out at [the National Security Agency]
tell me that we don't have the speed and the agility that we need,
in all circumstances, to deal with this new kind of enemy .... FISA
was passed by the Congress in 1978. There have been tremendous
advances in technology.., since then."216 On July 9, 2008 Congress
bowed to this pressure and expanded the FISA surveillance powers
to allow the warrantless surveillance of persons "reasonably be-
lieved" to be abroad. In passing the FISA Amendment of 2008
Congress increased the chances that FISA will be used pretextually
and missed a great opportunity to restore the pre-9/11 balance of
security and liberty by limiting the use of FISA's invasive surveil-
lance powers to those foreign intelligence crimes for which it was
originally intended.
204. See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of U.S. Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006,
at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-1 0-nsax.htm (Ac-
cording to an unnamed source, "[t ] he agency's goal is 'to create a database of every call ever
made' within the nation's borders"). When the TSP was initially disclosed to the public,
reports claimed that the program was limited to international electronic communications
but subsequent disclosures indicate that the program's reach may be much greater. Id.
205. Just after the 9/11 attacks John Ashcroft made a strikingly similar statement. See
supra note 172.
206. Press Briefing, The White House, Setting the Record Straight: Democrats Con-
tinue to Attack Terrorist Surveillance Program (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.
whitehoise.gox/news/releases/2006/01/20060122.html.
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